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ABSTRACT
DEAN STERLING KIDD: An examination ofthe USA Patriot Act
(Under the direction of Dr. John Winkle)
This thesis is an examination of various arguments for and against the
constitutionality ofthe USA Patriot Act in regard to the First and Fourth Amendments.
The arguments are generally in a framework of competing interests: national security and
civil liberties. Specifically, Sections 203, 206, 213, 215, 216, 218, and 505 of the Act are
discussed. The analysis of these sections includes their actual language, and commentary
from law journal articles. Relevant Supreme Court and lower court cases that relate to
national security are also incorporated. The thesis also has a general commentary about
the teiTor attacks which led to the passage ofthe USA Patriot Act and the reactions by
political leaders in the United States after these attacks occurred.
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Chapter I

THE USA PATRIOT ACT:PROTECTION OR ENCROACHMENT?

Background/Defining the Research Question
The USA Patriot Act was passed in response to the terrorist attacks in New York
City and Washington, D. C.on September 11, 2001. The official title ofthe bill is “Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism(USA Patriot Act) Act of2001

This was a major piece oflegislation,

and passed very quickly in response to a threat the like of which the coimtry had never
before faced. In the fervor of an omnipresent civic nationalism, the Patriot Act was largely
applauded. However,as time has gone by, certain provisions ofthe Act have attracted the
negative attention of many Constitutional scholars. While this will be discussed in much
more detail in the following chapters, it is essential to begin by identifying my research
question. The question that I identified at the outset ofthis project was,“Does the USA
Patriot Act violate any principles ofthe United States Constitution?” As I researched
fiirther, I narrowed the question, as it became clear which portions of the Constitution
would likely be threatened or weakened by the Act. Therefore, the final question is: Does
the USA Patriot Act exceed the need for enhanced national security by violating the 1®‘ and
4* Amendments to the United States Constitution?”

Defining the 1®‘ and 4* Amendments
Considering the nature ofthe question, it will be important to define exactly what is
stated in the 1®’ and 4* Amendments,as well any interpretations oftheir Constitutional
meanings by the Supreme Court. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting
the fi’ee exercise thereof; or abridging the fi"eedom ofspeech, or ofthe press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” This thesis will focus on the freedom ofexpression aspect ofthis
Amendment. The main potential problem with the Act in regard to the First Amendment
relates to the possibility ofa chilling effect. It is not hard to notice that a “chilling effect” is
not mentioned in the U* Amendment itself This is an important point, because the actual
meaning and force ofthe Amendment changes as the Supreme Court issues various rulings.
A chilling effect, in most basic terms, refers to any action by government which may cause
citizens to suppress their own beliefs for fear ofretribution from the government If a law is
mled to cause this type ofreaction without sufficient justification, it is likely to be found
unconstitutional. Because some ofthe provisions increase penalties and momtonng ability.
it seems likely they could potentially suppress expression by certain groups. For example,
if American Islamic groups that are generally unsupportive ofgovernment policies become
hesitant to engage in peaceful demonstration, for fear ofbeing labeled terrorist
sympathizers, then that could constitute a chilling effect. Possibilities such as the one in
this example seem limitless because ofthe widespread power ofthis Act and other
governmental actions after the attacks. Indeed, unlike the Fourth Amendment issues that
will be discussed, the First Amendment issues do not necessarily relate to specific
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provisions ofthe Act. Instead, this issue relates more to the general tenor ofthe Act. As a
result, less time will be spent discussing the First Amendment issues. However,this does
not meant this issue can be entirely ignored in this discussion, and that is why I have
included it. I will return to this subject in Chapter 3.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, and papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” In her outline of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, Jennifer Evans notes that protections provided under this Amendment have not
always been applicable to “domestic and foreign intelligence gathering.

Evans goes on to

provide a very useful jframework for considering the Fourth Amendment, and its
interpretation by the Supreme Court. As she notes, there have been shifts in doctrine over
the years.^ This point is echoed by Susan Herman. She points out that the Court, especially
more recently, has weakened the power ofthe Fourth Amendment,saying.
Fourth Amendment doctrine itself has created the loopholes within mth the Patriot
Act operates. Since the end of the Warren Court era. The Supreme ourt as pai
little more than lip service to Fourth Amendment precepts, generating myna
exceptions and exclusions^.
Between the two articles, they make an important, related point: Supreme Court decisions
change the meaning of Amendments over time. One important extension of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections occurred in 1967, when the Court ruled that these should be

Evans, Jennifer. Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 2001.” Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal 33(Summer 2002): 933-990.
^ 936-947. She discusses various aspects of Supreme Court doctrine.
^ Herman, Susan. “The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment.” Hansard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Law Review A\ (Winter 2006): 67-132. See page 71.
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extended to electronic surveillance of citizens.^ Because ofthis extension, and others, there
are numerous possible Constitutional problems in regard to the Fourth Amendment. These
problems will dominate much of the discussion, as they are much more specific than the
First Amendment concerns. Again,these will be outlined more clearly in Chapter 3.

Civil Liberties vs. Security
The question examined in this thesis is so important because of the debate in
society about the relationship between security and civil liberties. I am far fi"om being the
only person to notice the tensions involved with this Act, and the United States war on
terror in general. Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker note:
The government claims that it cannot effectively secure the safety of Americans
without having great latitude to investigate and prevent terrorist activities. Advocates of
civil liberties, however, argue that the government has gone too far, that is has excessively
circumnavigated American’s basic civil liberties beyond what is necessary to combat
terrorism.^
This is an excellent summation ofthe problem this thesis strives to explore, and it is an ageold question. The debate over civil liberties and national security was in full fling when the
Constitutional Convention began its work in 1787. As reported by Epstein and Walker,
“the delegates considered specific individual guarantees on at least four separate
»»6

occasions.

The authors also describe in some detail the battle between Anti-Federalists

(opposing the Constitution without a Bill ofRights)and the Federalists (favoring
ratification).^

Jordan, David Allen. “Decrypting the Fourth Amendment; Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced
Expectation of the Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol.” Boston College Law
Review 47(May 2006): 505-546. See page 515.
^ Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights. Liberties, and
Justice. 5* Ed.(Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004). See page 541.
^ See page 5.
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Indeed, as discussed above,the idea ofindividual freedoms has been very important
from the very founding of this nation. This is an obvious point as this country achieved its
freedom because the colonists felt they were being overwhelmed by a despot. However, it
has also been clear from the beginning that such freedoms must not be absolute. Indeed,
even the colonists fighting for their freedom were very distrustful of British loyalists.
LxDyalists were often ostracized, and sometimes even attacked. Therefore, even in the early
hours of this fine democracy, before the Constitution was even wntten, the right of people
to express their political beliefs freely was limited. This tradition, especially in time of war,
has continued throughout the country’s history. However, from a general standpoint, laws
are the foundation in a democratic society. At the same time, it is important that the general
citizenry recognize those governing as legitimate representatives and further believe that
the laws enacted by those governing are justifiable. In fact, as almost anyone who has taken
an American history class knows, the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution in
response to the fears of an overbearing central government. However, the discussion must
go deeper.
Throughout the current war on terror, the United States, through the leadership of
George W. Bush, has tried repeatedly to present itself as a moral beacon to the globe. In
fact, shortly after the terrorist attacks. Bush famously referred to the “Axis of Evil.” While
the three countries implicated in this labeling (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) had nothing to
do directly with the terrorist attacks of 2001, this type of language is emblematic of the
United States’ current debating style. Therefore, it would be incredibly hypocritical to
impose undue limits on the freedom of Americans. The government of this country has

’See pages 4-6.
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decided upon a leadership role for this country in the world community. While this is
noble, it is imperative to remember that unlike some countries, the United States has a
freely operating press. Therefore, if the government attempts to overwhelm individual
freedoms while promoting the ideas of freedom and liberty worldwide, it will undoubtedly
harm the country’s power on the world stage. However, the real problem is that the
fundamental rights of individual citizens may be harmed. The answer as to whether the
government is encroaching too far into citizen’s personal liberty is not concrete, but with an
intense study of specific provisions ofthe Patriot Act, I will strive to determine which side
is correct in the current debate. In examining this question, my thesis continues the age-old
tradition ofthe leaders of this country.
Innocent people are routinely sent to jail in the United States. The advent of DNA
evidence has even cleared people who were sitting on death row. This point relates to the
discussion for a very simple reason: if a suspected terrorist is sent to jail, they are unlikely
to have lots of people clamoring to defend them. While the United States is a long-standing
democracy, there have been atrocities committed by the government in the name of
national defense. Even more disturbing, many of these have occurred in the last century.
The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II is an excellent and disgusting
example. Another time which can be cited as a revolting invasion into people s individual
freedom occurred during the Red Scare. During this time. Senator.Joseph McCarthy was
given free reign to harass people, and mined the lives of many innocent people. From these
examples, it is obvious that the government is capable of overstepping its proper
boundaries when the security of the country is threatened. People certainly need to feel safe
from undue foreign danger. However, this security will mean

6

little if citizens have to fear

their own government. Importantly for this discussion, the government has already proven
to be overzealous in the war against terror, prosecuting an innocent citizen. Although the
government recognized its wrong,such mistakes cannot continue.

The Role ofthe Courts
It is important to remember who will decide which of the competing values of
individual liberty and security will prevail. As hinted at previously, the federal judiciary
will play a large role in deciding whether the Patriot Act is an appropriate use of
governmental influence. Speculation about the possible rulings, as well as rulings that have
already been handed down, will be discussed later. However, the important thing to note is
the power of a relative few in deciding the status of this legislation. Under the form of
government in the United States, it will not be the people at large that decide whether or not
the Act will stand, but federal judges throughout the country. This will occur through the
process ofjudicial review. Judicial review is the process whereby the courts examine laws
to determine whether or not they fit within the framework of the Constitution. In this, the
judicial branch could be considered to be a guardian ofthe rights of citizens. The reasoning
behind this idea is not complicated. Very rarely are there instances of legislative bodies
granting citizens too many individual rights. Another issue is the idea that legislators
sometimes get caught up in the tide of public opinion, and do not pay attention to the
Constitution when passing legislation. Article III federal judges are expected to be exempt
fi-om the pressures of public opinion, since they do not have to face re-election and serve
lifetime appointments. Therefore, these judges stand as a safeguard to ensure that the law of
the land is upheld.
Under the theory ofdemocracy, the people have already spoken, through their
7

legislators. However, it is important to remember that few Americans monitor the
legislative process closely. Even when they do, they most often get their information
secondhand, through some sort of media. Obviously, as complaints about the Act arise,
litigation will be the likely venue to express dissatisfaction. This is an important point; the
debate about the Act’s constitutionality is moot if nobody takes action in the court system.
It would be possible for demonstrators to protest outside Congressional meetings, but this is
a highly ineffective way to affect public pohcy. As has happened in earlier Constitutional
debates, it seems likely that groups such as the ACLU will provide the backing for such
suits. The average citizen does not have the resources to pursue such an issue financially,
nor do they have the time. Such cases will begin at lower levels, and a select few such
cases have taken place in regard to the Patriot Act. However, rulings that come from lower
courts do not have the force of law nationwide, and lower courts in different regions
sometimes produce conflicting rulings on the same issue. However, once such differences
arise, the likelihood of a higher power in the system clarifying which ruling to abide by
increases. Ultimately, the final decisions will be made by the United States Supreme Court.

Defining Terrorism
The discussion for this thesis is one that is extremely timely considering the state
the world community finds itself in today. The USA Patriot Act, as mentioned previously,
was designed to combat terrorism. Therefore, it is important to have some discussion about
what terrorism actually is. To begin with, it is certainly noted as a threat by many countries:
“International terrorism is often cited by world leaders as the greatest threat to Western
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democracies, a claim made both before and after September 11.

It is defined by Merriam
»»9

Webster as.

The systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.

Unfortunately, this definition is not very useful. In noting the difficulty of obtaining a solid
terminology for terrorism. Young states: “Notwithstanding the great concern about
terrorism, it is most often said that no universally (or even widely) accepted defimtion of
»»io

terrorism exists at international law.

Since this article refers to international law, it may

seem inappropriate to include such discussion in this paper. However, it seems important
that there be some sort of international consensus about such an important word, especially
since the United States will undoubtedly need help from other countries to fully enforce the
Patriot Act. Young thus discusses how an international definition of terrorism is needed.
11

and how he believes one could be created. In a related vein, in November 2006 a federal
judge in California, Audrey B. Collins, ruled against President Bush’s ability to designate
12

certain groups as terrorist organizations,

This case will be discussed in a more detailed

fashion in Chapter 4. Perhaps the best definition comes under the more general word
terror, also from Merriam Webster, “violent or destructive acts(as bombing) committed by
,,13

groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands.

® Young, Reuven. “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law
and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation.” Boston College International and Comparative
Law Review 29(Winter 2006): 23-103. See page 24.
^ “Definition of terrorism.” Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, <http://209.161.33.50/dictionary/terrorism>.
10

See page 24
There is no specific page here; this is what the entirety of the article discusses. Young takes a lengthy
approach to trying to define terrorism. He notes four different state definitions of terrorism, and ponders the
possibility of using these as a basis for a definition of terrorism. He also discusses the history of terrorism
and how the actions of terrorism have changed over time. This, undoubtedly, contributes to the confusion
foimd in the lack of an accepted definition.
Seper, Jerry. “Federal judge rules Bush executive order invalid; Authority lacking to ID ‘specially
designated global terrorists.’” The Washington Times 30 Nov. 2006, Nation A03.
“Definition of terror.” Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, <http://209.161.33.50/dictionary/terror>.
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However, once again, this is far too broad a definition to be meaningful in enforcing any
kind of law.
In addition to terrorism in general, the discussion must also involve the type of
terror faced in the attacks of September 11th. As Young notes in his article, today s
terrorism is more dangerous because “it comes from a mix of religious affiliation
«14

intertwined with political ideology and geo-political goals.

Indeed, as outlined by

Jennifer Evans, there have been many attacks involving the interests of the United States
15

since the early 1990s.

However, most Americans do not need to read an article to be

aware of this development. After the attacks, a highly religious group named Al-Qaeda
took responsibility for the attacks on the Twin Towers. Jihad is the main basis for this type
of action, and the attackers champion it as a legitimate expression of their religion. Jihad is
«16

defined by Meriam Webster as “a holy war waged on behalfofIslam as a religious duty.
As suggested by this definition, and as has been expressed in the press and media many
times since the attacks, the terrorists involved in suicide attacks such as these are
accompanied by statements stepped in religious motivations. Usually they call for a
jihad against the Great Satan, as the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran
dubbed America in 1979 ...Bin Laden’s Oct. 7 statement was similarly laced with
religious justifications for killing Americans^
Because of this, it is obvious that security and intelligence are important, since normal
measures of resistance seem unlikely to dissuade such zealots. On the other hand, it is

See page 28
In her article, Evans references attacks on the World Trade Center in 2003, the Oklahoma City bonjmgs,
the USS Cole, and the September 11 attacks, among others. As she notes, these are “only a sample of these
types of attacks. While it is true they do not all involve Islamic fervor, a solid majority of them do.
“Definition ofjihad.” Meniam Webster Online Dictionary, <http://209.161.33.50/dictionary/jihad>.
Cooper, Mary H. "Hating America." CO Researcher 11.41 (2001): 969-992. CQ Researcher Online. CQ
Press. J. D. Williams Library University, MS. 8 Feb 2007 <http://0-librai7.cqpress.conLumiss.lib.olemised
u:80/cqre searcher/cqresrre2001112300>.
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important to ensure that law enforcement does not grow overzealous in encroaching on the
rights of Americans. It is also essential that the rights of Americans who choose to practice
Islam are equally protected, and not especially scrutinized because they share religious
affiliation with the attackers of September 11*. This point relates to the earlier concern for
balance between civil liberties and security.
The importance of this discussion is only likely to grow in the coming years.
Terrorism has had several points in history in which it became a favored mode of attack,
but today’s terrorists seem more persistent. In fact, even though the United States has
managed to kill several terrorist leaders in the past few years, it has not deterred their effort.
As briefly addressed previously, these terrorists have little incentive to quit, since they are
not seeking only worldly goals. Today’s terrorism is unlike any threat the country has
faced before. The Japanese had suicide pilots in World War II, but the enemy in this war
has a seemingly unlimited supply of individuals willing to take their lives for the cause. In
addition, there are no clear borders in this war, as the past few years have made clear. In
previous engagements, the threat of nuclear war

has moderated the discussion. However,

end. If the United States
terrorists embrace nuclear weapons as just another means to an
actually wanted to use a nuclear attack on Al-Qaeda, there would be no clear target. The
point being made is that this is a war with no end in sight, unlike many others. Because of
this fact, any unlawful intrusion into civil liberties is likely to be a long-term situation,
rather than the relatively brief violations of the past. Therefore, it is imperative that the
United States ensure the responses being undertaken find the correct balance between all
the concerns. The stakes are incredibly high. It takes only one successful terrorist attack to
kill many innocent people, and create

general culture of fear. This was dramatically
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illuminated in 2001. Although Americans made a generally brave response, much of the
country was full of trepidation, and some still are today. Therefore, it is clearly important
that the government provide meaningful tools to fight this threat, which will likely be a part
of daily life for some time to come. However, as suggested above, the government also
must be careful not to violate the United States Constitution in fighting this threat.

Research Methods
For the research underlying this study, I used a qualitative approach. It should be
fairly obvious why I did so, as quantitative studies would not be all that useful is an
examination of Constitutional issues such as this one. In fact, I am unaware of any
statistics that would be useful in conducting a study of this type. If anything, it might be
enlightening to see how the majority of Americans feel about the Act. However, this is
clearly not enough information to base an entire thesis upon. On the other hand, there are
countless law journals and court cases related to this subject. In addition, while the
citizenry’s opinions are important because of reasons already mentioned, such as support of
the system, few Americans are Constitutional scholars. Nor are they on the edge of revolt
because of one law. Therefore, it is far more rational to rely on individuals who have
knowledge of the issue at hand. Another reason I have chosen the qualitative approach is
simple: it will likely be this type ofreasoning that ultimately determines the Act’s standing
in the real world. Barring a Constitutional amendment overturning the Patriot Act, which is
incredibly unlikely, the majority of Americans will not be consulted on the deciding vote.
Considering the percentage of the country that votes in the modem era, even if this issue
were posted on the ballot, a majority of Americans would not decide. As already discussed.
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the far more likely outcome is for the Supreme Court to decide. In doing so, it seems
unlikely that statistical analyses will play a major role, except for statistics about how many
Americans have been affected by the Act. I am unaware ofany Court opinion in relation to
national security that hinged on statistics that were presented to the Court.
I will be using many law journal articles as references in this paper. The specific
number is close to ten. While this may seem a small number,it is because I have chosen the
best articles, as well as a collection of recent ones. Many authors found the same problems
in the Act, and it is therefore foolish, as well as not feasible to include thoughts firom
thousands of law journals when a smaller number is sufficient. It is fi*om these articles that
I have learned much about the potential defects of the USA Patriot Act. While this interest
was sparked by news coverage, this coverage did not contain the hardcore Constitutional
information I needed. However, I will rely on some news reports to discuss rulings on the
Act, as well as more general information about the Act, and the war on terror. I have also
relied on the Act itself, as well as its reauthorizations, hi researching this legislation, I
encountered some difficulties in understanding exactly what some of the Sections actually
did, which helps to explain why the law journals were so useful. It was worthwhile to
study these bills, though, because it demonstrated to me how tricky it would likely be for
the average American to understand exactly what the law does. I also will rely on many
court cases from the past which relate to the balance of national security and civil liberties,
I chose this approach because the Patriot Act has, to date, received very little action in the
courts. While I will obviously discuss instances where the Act has indeed appeared m
Court, it is not even minimally conclusive about the fate of the Act at large. On the other
hand, because of the principles of precedent and stare decisis^ these Court cases fi'om the
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past could potentially help make a meaningful prediction about future cases.

Set-up of the Thesis
I have already hinted at the setup of this discussion several times, but I will lay it
out formally here. Chapter 2 will take a more in-depth look at the Act itself, and discuss
what exactly it does. For this, I will rely strongly on the law journals. Chapter 3 will take

an

in-depth look at the strongest Constitutional issues posed by the Act. Again, much of the
information found in this Chapter will come from law journals. Because of this, much of
Chapter 3 will be critical of the Act. Some journals argue more stringently than others, but
almost all find some defects with the Act. Chapter 4 will look at Court actions, both on
this legislation, and past actions in relation to national security. The reason for this set-up
may seem strange, but is really rather elementary once the facts are considered. The
journals that the information in Chapter 3 comes from are

written by scholars of

constitutional law. They are trained to find flaws. Therefore, Chapter 4 will partly attempt
m
to balance the argument with a presentation of previous exceptions allowed by the Court i.
the name of national security. It will also be important to consider cases related to the war
on terrorism, since they are linked to the Patriot Act because of their intent. Furthermore,
many of these cases are much timelier than other rulings related to national security. In
addition, the Chapter will include discussion on the very limited mlings related to the Act
itself Finally, in Chapter 5 I will analyze the findings. I will provide my opinion about the
findings ofthe research. In other words,I will state whether I believe those arguing for civil
liberties or those arguing for security have the strongest case in regard to the Patriot Act.
Chapter 5 will also attempt to predict the future actions fi'om the third branch.
14

Chapter 2

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE USA PATRIOT ACT
The Attacks
The Patriot Act was passed at a crucial juncture in American history. As discussed
in Chapter 1, the United States had never faced a threat of this magnitude, with the
possible exception ofPearl Harbor. However,Pearl Harbor was an attack on the United
States waged by another country. The perpetrators ofthe terrorist attacks were, and are,
much harder to track down than a sovereign nation. The terror of September 11 began
when a commercial airliner crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City. At
first, many thought the initial crash was an accident. However, after another plane came
into the second ofthe Twin Towers, it became vividly clear that there was no accident.
Two more planes would go down that morning,one crashing into the Pentagon and
another in a field in Pennsylvania. The one that crashed into the field was widely believed
to have been intended for the White House. Shortly after the attacks, a terrorist
organization known as al-Qaeda claimed responsibility. In particular, the leader of this
group, Osama bin Laden, was very vocal about a new war against America.
The country was in complete shock, and public officials were not exempt from
this feeling. Perhaps the best summation of feelings in America at the time is found m a
passage from the Christian Science Monitor “There s been a lot of cr)dng in America
indeed, the world-the past six days. Seldom in human history have the tragedies of a few
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hours’ time created so many spontaneous communities ofcomfort.

Representative Eric
19

Cantor remarked ‘“I couldn’t believe we were under that kind ofthreat,

However,it

did not take long for the President and other leaders to make strongly worded statements
about the resolve of the country to respond. On September 12*,President Bush stated
C46

These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat.
,»20

but they have failed.

Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfield did not wait to take

action. The Christian Science Monitor Report reported that “He ran to the scene [at the
Pentagon] and helped load some ofthe injured onto stretchers before a security detail
»,21

shooed him away.

Indeed, only three days after the attack. The Christian Science

Monitor reported that, “it seems increasingly likely that the United States will retaliate
with force... President Bush,the commander-in-chieftalks of‘heinous’ acts of war that
»22

must be responded to, and he vows to ‘conquer’ the enemy.’

From this report alone, the

memories ofthe aftermath of the terror attacks come flooding back in vivid detail. The
report was also very correct, as the United States would soon be militarily engaged in the
Middle Eastern nation of Afghanistan. As has already been mentioned, the perpetrators
were not military representatives of a specific country, but the regime in Afghanistan,
known as the Taliban, was known to protect al-Qaeda, and bin Laden was believed to be

Grier, Peter, et al. "A CHANGED WORLD." Christian Science Monitor 93.205(2001): 1. Newspaegr
Source.9 February 2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com>. See page 2. For a summation of all that happened
on September 11* and the days following, there is probably no better article.
Grier. See page 6.
20
Schmemann, Serge.“U S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for ‘Evil’” The New York
Times Section A. Column 4. Pg. 1. Late Ed. Sep. 12,2001. 3 Jan. 2007 < http://0-web.lexisnexis.com.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/>.
Grier. See page 5.
,
Knickerbocker, Brad.“US Possesses a Large ‘Hammer’, but How to Wield It?”'US possesses a large
'hammer,' but how to wield it?" rhristian Science Monitor 93.204(2001): 2. Newspaper So^.9 Feb.
2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com>. It is not imperative that readers review the entire article, because it is
largely a discussion of the overall possible military strategy. However, it is useful in the sense that it
captures very well the attitude in the country at the time.
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hiding in the caves of this nation. Bin Laden has still not been located, but the search
continues on to this day. The Bush administration also made at least some effort to build
international consensus:

The US is reaching out to firiend and foe alike as it seeks to
,23

build an international coalition to fight the scourge of terrorism.’
By identifying the attacks as parts of a war, Bush ensured that he would be the
leader in determining the appropriate form ofresponse, since the government is given
greater powers in times of war. This phenomenon has been proved throughout the
country’s history, such as with the internment of Japanese citizens. Another example, and
probably the most dramatic, is the use ofthe military draft in previous long-term
engagements. Indeed, it would not be long after September 11 before the Bush
administration went to work, with Attorney General John Ashcroft providing a draft of a
bill intended to strengthen the ability ofthe United States to respond to terrorism.
Although the Congress did not give Bush all the power he requested, this administration
draft would become the framework for the USA Patriot Act. As reported by the
Congressional Research Service, “It[The Patriot Act] flows from a consultation draft
circulated by the Department of Justice, to which Congress made substantial
„24

modifications and additions.

The last point is an important point to remember; the

Patriot Act was a collaborative effort between the executive branch and the legislative
branch. Because the Congress made its own modifications after debate, the separation of
powers doctrine was in full force in the passing of this Act. As will be discussed later,
this Act has faced and will likely continue to face action from the third branch.

” LaFranchi, Howard, and Ann Scott Tyson.“A New World Order?(Cover story)." Chnstian Scienge
Monitor 93.204 (2001): 1. Newspaper Source. 11 Jan. 2007. http://search.ebscohost.com. See^ge 1.
24
Doyle, Charles. “The USA Patriot Act: A Legal Analysis” Congressional Resource Service The Library
of Congress. 15 April 2002 Order Code RL31377. 1-75. See Summary page.
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Passing the Patriot Act into Law
The Patriot Act, as mentioned in Chapter 1, was passed as H. R. 3162. However,
simply commenting on this does not come close to capturing the complexities ofgetting
both houses of Congress to pass the bill. As with any other legislation, the Act had to be
passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives, and their versions of the bill
had to agree. According to the summary in Charles Doyle’s analysis, the bill had to go
through several versions before it was able to accomplish this threshold, beginmng as the
PATRIOT Act in the House and the USA Act in the Senate.^^ The Senate was the first to
26

act, as S. 1510 was passed on October 11,2001, by a vote of96-l, without amendment.
Interestingly, the bill had support from both sides ofthe aisle: the primary sponsor was
Democrat Tom Daschle, and the 25 co-sponsors ranged from Trent Lott of Mississippi(a
Republican) to Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York(a Democrat).^’ The House acted
the same day, with its Judiciary Committee reporting out an amended version ofthe
28

initial anti-terror legislation proposal that had been presented by the Attorney

General.

The following day, the House passed H. R. 2975, by a vote of337-79.^^ As in the Senate,
the bill had bipartisan support, with Republican James Sensenbrenner serving as the
sponsor, with 26 co-sponsors, including Democrats such as Robert Wexler and Sheila
30

Jackson-Lee.

The House version ofthe bill did not initially match up with the version

passed by the Senate. This is not an uncommon occurrence, as it is difficult to get two

See page 1.
The Library of Congress. Thomas.<http://thomas■loc.gov/cgi-bm^dquery/z?dl 07.SN015 ■>
The Library of Congress. Thomas.<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin^dquery/z?dl07:SN015IU:
Doyle, Charles. Seepage 1.
ojim
The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin^dquery/z?dl07:HR029/y.
The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/bdquery/z7dl07:HR02975;>
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completely separate legislative bodies to pass identical bills. However,in the system in
the United States, the versions ofthe bill must be reconciled before being sent to the
President. Rather than having a conference committee, on October 24*,the House, by a
vote of 357-66, passed H. R. 3162, which resolved the differences between the House and
31

Senate bills. Sensenbrenner, who was Chair ofthe House Judiciary Committee,said the
legislation was “‘vitally needed...to get the intelligence necessary to protect the people of
»,32

the United States of America from whatever the enemy has up its sleeve,

In this

declaration, Sensenbrenner purposefully emphasized the need for a stronger national
security. In contrast, the Representatives in opposition were very disturbed with the
process used to pass the legislation: Barney Frank, a Democrat, said “This bill, ironically,
which has been given all of these high-flying acronyms...has been debated in the most
,»33

undemocratic way possible,

The Senate, by a vote of98-1, passed the same bill

without amendment on October 25*, and it was sent to President.^"^ Tom Daschle,in his
remarks, was not quite as emphatic: “This has not been easy...We were able to find what
I think is the appropriate balance between protecting civil liberties and privacy, and
»35

ensuring that law enforcement has the tools that it needs to the job it must,

Therefore,

for such a wide-reaching bill, this legislation passed relatively quickly, as it was signed
36

into law by President Bush on October 26,2001, becoming Public Law 107-56.

The

Act does many different things, and much of it is beyond the scope and concern of this

The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/bdquery/z7dl07:HR03162:>(1 p).
Kuhnhenn, James. “House Passes rnyntPr.Tprrnnsm Bill.” Knight Ridder Tribune Washington Bureau
(DC). Newspaper Source Oct. 25, 2001. 11 Jan. 2007 <http://search.ebscohost.com>. See page 1.
33
Kuhnhenn, James.“House Passes Counter-Terrorism Bill.” See page 1.
34
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35
Kuhnhenn, James. "Senate Approves Counter-Terrorism Bill." October 26, 2001 Knight Ridder Tribung
Washington Bureau(DC). Newspaper Source. 11 February 2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com>. See page
2.
36
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thesis. However, because ofthe nature of the research question, it is important to review
the bill as a whole. In so doing, an important point will be made from the outset. This
thesis examines only certain provisions at an in-depth level. Many portions ofthe Act do
not raise Constitutional questions. However,the purpose ofthe next section is to provide
information about the Act as a whole.

The Provisions of the Act
The Act begins with Section 1, which includes the short title and the table of
contents. It is a very short portion ofthe legislation, and the real meat of the bill is found
in the various Titles.
Title I of the Act is entitled,“Enhancing Domestic Security against Terrorism.
Title I is the shortest ofthe all the titles. One ofthe most significant Sections in
this Title is found in the Congressional condemnation of discrimination against Arab and
Muslim Americans.^^ This had to be included because ofthe xenophobia that existed
after the attacks, with Americans feeling great hatred and fear in regard to Islam.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING DISCRIMINATIONAGAINST ARAB AND
MUSLIM AMERICANS.(a)FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following fmdings:(l) Arab Americans,
Muslim Americans, and Americansfrom South Asia play a vital role in our Nation and are entitled
to nothing less than the full rights of every American.(2) The acts of violence that have been taken agamst
Arab and Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States shou
e an
are condemned by all Americans who value freedom.(3)The concept ofindividual responsibility or
wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American society, and applies equally to all religious, racial, and ®^
groups.(4) When American citizens commit acts of violence against those who are, or are perceive to e,
of Arab or Muslim descent, they should be punished to the full extent ofthe law.(5) Muslim Americans
have become so fearful of harassment that many Muslim women are changing the way they dress to avoi
becoming targets.(6) Many Arab Americans and Muslim Americans have acted heroically during t e
attacks on the United States, including Mohammed Salman Hamdani, a 23-year-old New Yor er o
Pakistani descent, who is believed to have gone to the World Trade Center to offer rescue assistance an is
now missing.(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—(1)the civil nghts and civil
liberties of all Americans,including Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Amencans from South Asia,
must be protected, and that every effort must be taken to preserve their safety;(2)any acts of violence or
discrimination against any Americans be condemned; and (3)the Nation is called upon to recognize e
patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds.
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Title II, entitled Enhanced Surveillance Procedures” is where most ofthe
Constitutional questions to be discussed in Chapter 3 arise. Therefore, I will save my
commentary regarding this Title for that Chapter.
Title III, entitled International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001” deals with what it sounds like, terrorist financing. Title
III is extremely long, with three Subtitles, and takes numerous steps to try to limit the
resources of terrorists. Some of the measures undertaken include attempting to deter
38

money laundering through cooperation between financial institutions and government,
requiring brokers to report suspicious activity, and working with foreign governments
to identify the originators of wire transfers."^®
Title IV is entitled, “Protecting the Border,” and has three subtitles. These
Subtitles, are, in order, “Protecting the Northern Border,”“Enhanced Immigration
Provisions,” and “Preservation ofImmigration Benefits for Victims of Terrorism.”
Subtitle A attempts to address the problem of inadequate security personnel on the border
shared with Canada. Subtitle B strives to strengthen the security in the immigration
process, including increasing monitoring of foreign students"^^ and strengthening
vigilance against possible passport tampering."^^ Subtitle C deals with immigrants whose
status was affected by the terrorist attacks, ranging from those who were killed in the
44

attacks"'^ to those who missed deadlines on paperwork as a result ofthe attacks.
Title V is named “Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism.” This Title

38

Section 314
Section 356
40
Section 330
Section 416
42
Section 417
43
Section 423
44
Section 425
39
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contains one of the Sections that will be discussed in Chapter 3 as a possible
Constitutional problem. In addition to that Section, the Title deals mainly with the ability
46

of the government to pay rewards, and disclosure of certain records.
Title VI is identified as “Providing for Victims of Terrorism,Public Safety
Families of Public Safety Officers” and “Subtitle B—^Amendments to the Victims of
Crime Act of 1984.” This Title needs very little explanation, because the wording in its
name and the names of the subtitles captures very well its purpose.
Title VII, “Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infirastructure Protection ,
contains only one section, and it is meant to increase the commumcation between levels
of government.
Title VIII is called “Strengthening the Criminal Laws against Terrorism.” This
Title includes two definitions."*^ Also, as suggested by the wording above, this Title seeks
to provide a deterrent against future attacks by, among other things, providing that certain

Sections 501 and 502 deal with the Attorney General’s authority to pay rewards to combat terrorism, and
with the Secretary of State’s authority to do the same
Sections 507 and 508 deal with the disclosure of education records and information fromNCES surveys,
respectively.
SEC. 802. DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM.(a)DOMESTIC TERRORISM DEFINED.—
Section 2331 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—(1)in paragraph (l)(B)(iii), by striking by
assassination or kidnapping” and inserting ‘‘by mass destruction, assassination, or ki^appmg ,()m
paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘and”;(3)in paragraph (4), by striking the period at die end and msertmg ;
and ; and (4)by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(5) the term ‘domestic terrorism means ac vi es
that— ‘‘(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation ofthe criminal laws ofthe Urn e
States or of any State; “(B)appear to be intended-‘‘(i)to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
‘‘(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect e con uc o a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and ‘‘(C) occur primarily wi ^ ®
territorial jurisdiction ofthe United States.”,(b)CONFORMING AMENDMENT. ection
^ ®
title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: “(1)‘act ofterrorism means an ac o omes ic
or international terrorism as defined in section 2331;”.
lo tt >
SEC. 808. DEFINITION OF FEDERAL CRIME OF TERRORISM. Section 2332b
States Code, is amended—(1)in subsection (f), by inserting ‘‘and any violation of section 351(e), 844(e),
844(f)(1), 956(b), 1361, 1366(b), 1366(c), 1751(e),2152,or2156ofthistitle,” before and the
Secretary”; and(2)in subsection (g)(5)(B), by striking clauses(i) through (iii) an msertmg e o o
g.
‘‘(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37(relating to violence a
international airports), 81 (relating to arson within special maritime and territorial juris iction),
or

22

acts of terrorism will have no statute of limitations on punishment"^^ being brought.
Title IX, named “Improved Intelligence,” deals mainly with activities ofthe
Central Intelligence Agency, or the CIA. Specifically, it addresses the responsibilities of
the Director ofthe CIA in regard to the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978"^^:
[It]allows for wiretapping of aliens and citizens in the United States when there is
probable cause to believe that the target ofthe wiretap is a member of a foreign
terrorist group or an agent of a foreign power...Designed to maintain a balance
between national security interests and the privacy interests of United States
citizens, FISA requires that a designated government official apply for electronic
surveillance warrants.^®
In addition, disclosure to the Director of information related to foreign intelligence that is
gathered in criminal investigations domestically^^ is addressed, and is intended to ensure

(relating to biological weapons), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), subsection (a),(b),(c), or(d)of
section 351 (relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and kidnaping), 831
(relating to nuclear materials), 842(m)or(n)(relating to plastic explosives), 844(f)(2) or(3)(relating to
arson and bombing of Government property risking or causing death), 844(i)(relating to arson and
bombing of property used in interstate commerce), 930(c)(relating to killing or attempted killing during an
attack on a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(l)(relating to conspiracy to murder, kidnap,
or maim persons abroad), 1030(a)(1)(relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) resulting in
damage as defined in 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through(v)(relating to protection ofcomputere), 1114(relating to
killing or attempted killing of officers and employees ofthe United States), 1116 (relating to murder or
manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons), 1203 (relating to
hostage taking), 1362 (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations, or systena), 1363 (relating
to injury to buildings or property within special maritime and territorialjurisdiction ofthe United States),
1366(a)(relating to destruction of an energy facility), 1751(a),(b),(c), or(d)(relating to Presidential and
Presidential staff assassination and kidnaping), 1992(relating to wrecking trains), 1993(relating to terrorist
attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems), 2155 (relating to destmction of
national defense materials, premises, or utilities), 2280(relating to violence against maritime navigation),
2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332(relating to certain homicides and other
violence against United States nationals occurring outside ofthe United States), 2332a (relating to use of
weapons of mass destruction), 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2339
(relating to harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing material support to terrorists), 2339B
(relating to providing material support to terrorist organizations), or 2340A (relating to torture) of ®
title; “(ii) section 236(relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) ofthe Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2284); or “(iii) section 46502(relating to aircraft piracy), the second sentence of section 46504
(relating to assault on a flight crew with a dangerous weapon), section 46505(b)(3) or(c)(relatii^ to
explosive or incendiary devices, or endangerment of human life by means of weapons, on ^i^cra ), section
46506 if homicide or attempted homicide is involved (relating to application of certain cnimna aws to ac s
on aircraft), or section 60123(b)(relating to destruction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline
facility) of title 49.”.
, _
i_i ■ i
j
48
This is found in Section 809, and refers to crimes that “resulted in, or created a foreseeable nsk of, death
or serious bodily injury to another person.”
49
Section 901
50
Evans, Jennifer. See page 955.
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the coordination of information from various layers oflaw enforcement.
As is common in legislation, the final Title, Title X,is “Miscellaneous.” As
suggested by the name, the contents of this Title do not neatly fit under any other Title.
Some of issues addressed by the underlying Sections include Assistance to first
53

responders*''“ and critical infrastructures protection.
As can be seen from the information in the preceding pages,this legislation
covers a large variety of topics. It is an act that is likely to remain important for a long
time. However,some ofthe provisions were set to sunset, or expire,in 2005. Therefore,
the Congress had to hold hearings on the reauthorization of parts ofthis legislation.

Reauthorizing the Patriot Act
The USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of2005 was signed
into law by the President on March 9, 2006, becoming P.L. 109-177.^'* As suggested by
the date in the name, it took far longer for this to be passed than the sponsors would have
liked. In fact, the House and Senate had both passed USA Patriot Act Reauthorization
Acts in July 2005. However, it took eight months before the conference report, H. Rept.
109-333, was finally accepted by both houses of Congress. It is important to note that
approval was achieved much quicker in the House than the Senate: it was passed in the
House on December 14, 2005; March 2,2006 in the Senate.^^ As evidenced by the
timelines, this was a long battle, with many Democratic members of Congress exhibiting
steadfast resistance. Obviously, the Senate was the base for the fight. This resistance

Section 905
Section 1005
53
Section 1016
52

54
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movement was led by Russ Feingold, who is rumored to be a potential Presidential
candidate in 2008. According to reports, he exhibited stringent opposition in a
“monthslong fight,” and had previously “led a successful bipartisan filibuster...
,56

demanding additional limits on investigative tools.’

The additional limits referred to are

contained in the additional reauthorizing amendments, which will be discussed later in
the Chapter. Feingold provided the rationale for his long fight in a strongly worded
statement, remarking ‘“This fight was about trying to restore the public’s trust in our
government...the government is willing to trample on the law and constitutional
»,57

guarantees in the fight against terrorism,

This is an important point, because, as

alluded to previously, there were no such holdups ofthe process in 2001. In fact,
although some Democratic Senators were reticent to support the initial legislation,
Feingold was the only Senator to actually vote against it. The change in course
represents the idea ofsome that the Act had gone too far, and their determination to stop
it from continuing to do so. However,the Act still received strong support from some in
the Senate: upon passage of the bill. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist remarked “Today,
we are making a statement that we cannot return to the pre-9/11 structure that could cost
„S8

innocent Americans their lives.
59

margin of 89-10.

In the end,the bill still passed by the substantial

As mentioned previously, the debate in the House did not take as long.

The bill passed the House by a vote of 251-174. Therefore, since the reauthorization
passed, the argument of those in opposition was not an entirely successful one. I use the
word entirely, because they certainly did a good job of preventing the legislation from
56

Dinan, Stephen. "Patriot Act wins Senate approval." Washington Times, The(DQ . Newspaper Source
Mar. 3, 2006. 11 February 2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com>. See page 2
57
Dinan, Stephen. See page 2.
58
Dinan, Stephen. See page 1.
59
The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/bdquery/z7dl09:HR03199:@@@R>.

25

flying through Congress as quickly as it had in its initial appearance. They also gained
some concessions in regard to civil liberties, which will be discussed later.

The Provisions of the Patriot Act Reauthorization
Title I is “USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act.” Obviously,this is
the title of the most concern to this study. Some ofthese Sections deal with the
provisions from the initial Act that Constitutional scholars have found the most troubling.
As reported by the Congressional Research Service,“Title I postpones expiration of
sections 206 and 215 until December 31,2009 and makes permanent the other USA
»60

Patriot Act Amendments.

This is an important point, because 206 and 215 will both be

addressed in the next Chapter. Several other noteworthy changes were made to Section
215:

60

Doyle, Charles and Brian T. Yeh.“USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of2005; A
Sketch.” CRS Report for Congress. Order Code R22412.28 March 2006.1-6.
61
SEC. 106. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS UNDER SECTKW
_
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT.(a)DIRECTOR APPROVAL FOR CERTAIN^PLIt^1lU .
Subsection(a)ofsection 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(50 U.b.u isoitajj is
amended— (1) in paragraph (1), by striking “The Director” and inserting Su
°
nrHpr*
Director”; and (2)by adding at the end the following: “(3)In the case ofan app ica on or
requiring the production of library circulation records, library patron lists, book sa es recor ,
customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records,^ me ca rec
ji .
information that would identify a person, the Director of the Federal Bureau
the authority to make such application to either the Deputy Director ofthe Fe era ^ Dpnntv Director
or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security (or any
^^rTTlAT BASIS FOR
or the Executive Assistant Director may not further delegate such authority. ● w
^
REQUESTED ORDER.—Subsection (b)(2) ofsuch section is amended to read as foEoj^ ^
include—‘‘(A) a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to e lev
things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessmen)con
etatpc
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information
i ●
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence ac vi es,
^ ^
presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation if the applicant shows m e ® ®^
susnected
L they pertain to- “(.) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; “(n) .
agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation, or (in)
.i,*
j
contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the su Ject ° ^
General
investigation; and ‘‘(B) an enumeration of the minimization procedures adop ® J
R„rpan nf
under subsection(g)that are applicable to the retention and dissemination by e e era
Investigation of any tangible things to be made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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based on the order requested in such application.”,(c)CLARIFICATION OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION.—Subsection (c)(1) of such section is amended to read as follows: “(c)(1)Upon an
application made pursuant to this section, if the judge finds that the application meets the requirements of
subsections(a) and (b). the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the
release of tangible things. Such order shall direct that minimization proceduresadopted pursuant to
subsection (g) be followed.",(d) ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS.—Subsection(c)(2) ofsuch section
is amended to read as follows:"(2) An order under this subsection—“(A)shall describe the tangible things
that are ordered o be produced with sufficient particularity to permit them to be fairly identified;“(B) shall
include the date on which the tangible things must be provided, which shall allow a reasonable period
of time within which the tangible things can be assembled and made available; “(C)shall provide clear and
conspicuous notice of the principles and procedures described in subsection (d); “(D)may only require the
production of a tangible thing if such thing can be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court
of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a court ofthe
United States directing the production of records or tangible things; and “(E)shall not disclose that such
order is issued for purposes of an investigation described in subsection (a).”(e)PROHIBrnON ON
DISCLOSURE.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended to read as follows: “(d)(1) No person shall
disclose to any other person that the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation has sought or obtained togible
things pursuant to an order under this section, other than to—“(A)those persons to whom disclosure is
necessary to comply with such order; “(B)an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance with
respect to the production of things in response to the order; or “(C)other persons as permitted by the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of Ae Director. (2)(A)A person to whom
disclosure is made pursuant to paragraph(1)shall be subject to the nondisclosure requirements
applicable to a person to whom an order is directed under this section in the same manner as such person.
“(B) Ajiy person who discloses to a person described in subparagraph(A),(B), or(C)ofparagraph(1)Aat
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things pursuant to^^ order under this
section shall notify such person of the nondisclosure requirements ofthis subsection. (C)At the request of
the Director of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation or the designee ofthe Director, any person making
or intending to make a disclosure under this section shall identify to the Director or such desi^ee e
person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was made prior to e request,
but in no circumstance shall a person be required to inform the Director or such
intends to consult an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance.”,(f) JUDICIA
^{)
PETITION REVIEW POOL.—Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(50 U.S.C.
1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: “(e)(1)Three judges designated
under subsection(a) who reside within 20 miles ofthe District of Columbia,or, ifa o sue
are
unavailable, other judges of the court established under subsection (a) as may be esi^a ® V ®
presiding judge of such court, shall comprise a petition review pool which shall have juns ic on o review
petitions filed pursuant to section 501(f)(1). “(2) Not later than 60 days after the date ofthe enactment
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of2005, the court established under
subsection(a)shall adopt and, consistent with the protection of national secunty, pu is prow ures or e
review of petitions filed pursuant to section 501(f)(1) by the panel establishe un er para^ap ( ). uc
procedures shall provide that review of a petition shall be conducted in camera m s a a so provi e or
the designation of an acting presiding Judge.”.(2)PROCEEDINGS. Seetton
o e °rei^
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(50 U.S.C. 1861)is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection: ‘‘(f)(1) A person receiving an order to produce any tMgi e ng un er s
section may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition with the poo es is e y sec on
103(e)(1).The presiding Judge shall immediately assign the petition to one o e ju ges servmg in sue
pool. Not later than 72 hours after the assignment ofsuch petition, the assize
S® s a con uc an
initial review of the petition. If the assigned Judge determines that the pehtion is vo ous, e assigne
Judge shall immediately deny the petition and affirm the order. If the assigne ju ge e
^ e pe ion
is not frivolous, the assigned Judge shall promptly consider the petition in accor
^
e proce mes
established pursuant to section 103(e)(2) The Judge considering the petition^ modify or set aside the
order only if the Judge finds that the order does not meet the requiremen s o
s sec on or is o ®rwise
unlawful. If the judge does not modify or set aside the order, the Judge shall immediately affirm the order
and order the recipient to comply therewith. The assigned Judge shall promptly provide a wntten statement
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for the record of the reasons for any determination under this paragraph. “(2)A petition for review ofa
decision to affirm, modify, or set aside an order by the United States or any person receiving such order
shall be to the court of review established under section 103(b), which shall have jurisdiction to consider
such petitions. The court of review shall provide for the record a written statement ofthe reasons for its
decision and, on petition of the United States or any person receiving such order for writ ofcertiorari, the
record shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to review such
decision. ‘‘(3) Judicial proceedings under this subsection shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible.
The record of proceedings, including petitions filed, orders granted, and statements of reasons for decision,
shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice ofthe United States in
consultation with the Anomey General and the Director of National Intelligence. “(4)All petitions under
this subsection shall be filed under seal. In any proceedings under this subsection, the court shall, upon
request of the government, review ex parte and in camera any government submission, or portions thereof,
which may include classified information.”,(g) MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES AND USE OF
INFORMATION.—Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(50 U.S.C. 1861)is
further amended by adding at the end the ‘‘(g) MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES.—“(1)IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment ofthe USA PATRIOT In^rovement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Attorney General shall adopt specific mmimization procedures
governing the retention and dissemination by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation ofany tangible things, or
information therein, received by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation in response to an order under this title.
‘‘(2) DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘minimization procedures’ means— “(A)specific procedures
that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of an order for the production oftangible
things, to minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information
concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need ofthe United States to obtai^
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;“(B) procedures that require that nonpublicly
available information, which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in section 101(e)(1), shall
not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such person s coment,
unless such person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its
importance; and*‘(C) notwithstanding subparagraphs(A)and (B), procedures that allow for fte rete^on
and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to e
committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes, (h)US
INFORMATION.—Information acquired fi-om tangible things received by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in response to an order under this title concerning any United States person may be used and
disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the United States person o y m
accordance with the minimization procedures adopted pursuant to subsection g). No othervnse pnvi ege
information acquired from tangible things received by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation m accor ance
with the provisions of this title shall lose its privileged character. No information acqimed fromtangib e
order under this title may be used
things received by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation in response to an
vrrnn
or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes.”.
.
OVERSIGHT.—Section 502 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(50 U.b.U 180ZJ is
amended—(1)in subsection(a)—(A)by striking “semiannual basis” and inserting annual basis ; an
(B)by inserting ‘‘and the Committee on the Judiciary” after “and the Select Committee on Intdhgence ,
(2)in subsection(b)—(A)by striking “On a semiannual basis” and all that follows
®
preceding 6-month period” and inserting “In April ofeach year, the Attorney ^er s
su nu o e
House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary and the House Peimanent Select Comimttee on hitelhgence
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence a report setting forth with respect to fteprecedmg
calendar year”;(B)in paragraph (1), by striking “and” at the end;(C)m p^agraph(2), by striking fte
period at the end and inserting “; and”; and(D)by adding at the end the followmg n<=lPf^Srapb: (3)
the number of such orders either granted, modified, or denied for the production ofeach of*e foUov^g.
‘‘(A) Library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, or book custonsr hsts^ (B)
Firearms sales records. “(C)Tax return records. “(D)Educational records, p)Mepal rpords
containing information that would identify a person.”; and(3)by addii^ at era e o owu^n^
subsection: “(c)(1) In April of each year, the Attorney General shall submit to Confess a report settmg
forth with respect to the preceding year- “(A)the total number of applications made for orders apirovmg
requests for the production of tangible things under section 501; and “(B)the total number ofsuch orders

28

Title I adds several safeguards to the use of Section 215...First, it provides that
the FBI Director, Deputy Director, or the Executive Assistant Director for
National Security must approve orders for the production of certain
records...Title I establishes a judicial review process for recipients of215 orders
to challenge them...Title I expressly clarifies that a recipient ofa 215 order may
disclose its existence to an attorney to obtain legal advice, as well as to other
62
persons approved by the FBI.
As can be seen both from the preceding analysis, and the extremely comprehensive
nature of the legislation included in the footnote. Congress was very concerned with
Section 215. These changes certainly made a difference in the way that Section fimctions.
This point is emphasized in the report by Doyle and Yeh, which states:
Congressional oversight of the use ofFISA authority is enhanced...by requiring
the Attorney General to report to both Houses’ Judiciary and Intelligence
Committees concerning FISA order disclosures, electronic surveillance orders,
and physical searches. In addition, the Inspector General is instructed to perform a
comprehensive audit if the effectiveness and use ofthe FBI’s FISA authority, for
submission to the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees for calendar years 200563
2006.
Title I addresses “sneak and peak” warrants, by “permitting notification delays of no
more than 30 days, with 90-day extensions as the facts justify; removing undue trial delay
as a ground for delayed notification; and requiring annual reports to Congress on the use
,»64

of this authority.

Sneak and peak warrants will be discussed in more detail in Chapter

3. Finally, this Title:
extends the tenure for both initial and extension orders authorizing installation
and use of FISA pen registers and trap and trace surveillance devices firom a
period of90 days to one year,in cases in which the government has certified that
the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not
concerning a U. S. person.^^

either granted, modified, or denied. “(2)Each report under this subsection shall be submitted in
unclassified form.”.
62

Doyle, Charles and Brian T. Yeh. See page 1.
See page 3.
64
Doyle, Charles and Brian T. Yeh. See page 4.
65
Doyle, Charles and Brian T. Yeh. See page 3.
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Title II is “Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement.” It is relatively short, but
includes two subtitles: “Terrorist penalties enhancement Act” and “Federal Death Penalty
Procedures.” This Title deals mainly with punishment ofterrorists, including their post
66

release supervision.

According to Doyle and Yeh, it “makes several adjustments in

federal death penalty law” including procedures in “air piracy cases...federal capital drug
»,67

cases...[andjthe appointment of counsel in capital indigent defendant cases.
Title III, “Reducing Crime and Terrorism at America’s Seaports,” attempts to
discourage any type of fraudulent activity at seaports in the country. Among other things,
68

it seeks to prevent the transportation of dangerous materials and terrorists.
Title IV, Combating Terrorist Financing,” needs very little explanation.
However, Section 406 does relate directly to the USA Patriot Act, dealing mainly with
69

technical corrections and clarifications.

66

Section 212
See pages 4-5.
68
Section 305
j ju
69
(a) TECHNICAL CORJRECTIONS.—(1)Section 322 ofPubUc Law 107-56 is amended^
“title 18” and inserting “title 28”.(2)Section 1956(b)(3) and(4)oftitle '*>
,g
amended by striking “described in paragraph(2)” each time it appears; and(3)Section
1
United States Code, is amended by striking “foreign bank” each time it appears^
® ccmnivj
financial institution (as defined in section 984(c)(2)(A)of this title)”,(b)CODIFICATION OF SEC IIUN
316 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT. (1) Chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-(A)m
((
protection. ,and
the chapter analysis, by inserting at the end the following: 987. Anti-terrorist forfeiture
● “/
rm-xn
(B)by inserting at the end the following: “§ 987. Anti-terrorist forfeiture protection (a) KJGHTTO
Contest.—An owner of property that is confiscated under any provision oflaw relating o e c
of assets of suspected international terrorists, may contest that confiscation by filing a c
m
set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Supplemental Rules for Certain
^^
(«
Claims), and asserting as an affirmative defense that— m the property is not subject to confiscation
of title 18, Umted
under such provision of law; or “(2) the innocent owner provisions of section
, 983(d)
,
67

States Code, apply to the case, “(b)Evidence.—In considering a claim filed mder tHs sec o^
admit evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Eridence, i t e co
®®
that the evidence is reliable, and that compliance with the Federal Rules ° ^
The
national security interests of the United States, “(c) CLARIFICATIONS.— (1)
® °
●
exclusion of certain provisions of Federal law from the definition of the term cm or ei ®
section 983(i) of title 18, United States Code, shall not be construed to deny an owner
the right to contest the confiscation of assets of suspected international terronsts im er ( ®
(a) of this section; “(B)the Constitution; or “(C)subchapter II ofchapter 5 of title
Code (commonly known as the ‘Administrative Procedure Act’)- “(2) SAVINGS CLAUSE. Nothi g
section shall limit or otherwise affect any other remedies that may be available to an owner o property
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Title V,“Miscellaneous Provisions,” deals with a variety ofissues, including
70

setting the Director of Homeland Security’s place in the line ofPresidential succession.
Title VI, “Secret Service,” focuses partly on the Service’s role in dealing with
national special security events,^* and these provisions are the ones most related to the
subject at hand.
Title VII,“Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of2005,” has very little
relation to the overall tone of this discussion. It seems to be a curious inclusion in an Act
focused on terrorism-centered issues, and is only included for the sake of completeness. It
includes five subtitles, A-E, but for the reasons just discussed, their word titles will not be
all laid out here.

Debating the Additional Reauthorization Amendments
Even after the extensive reauthorization process discussed, the Patriot Act was to
undergo another modification. This was signed into law by the President the same day as
72

H. R. 3199, becoming P. L. 109-178. Entitled “USA Patriot Act Additional
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of2006,” or S. 2271, it is much shorter than the first
reauthorization. However, without this addition, the initial reauthorization likely would
not have passed. It was sponsored by a Senator who had previously been critical ofthe

under section 983 of title 18, United States Code, or any other provision oflaw.”.(2)Subsections(a),(b),
and (c) of section 316 of Public Law 107-56 are repealed,(c) Conforming Amendments CONCERNING
Conspiracies.— (1) Section 33(a) of title 18, United States Code is amended by inserting “or conspires”
before “to do any of the aforesaid acts”.(2)Section 1366(a)oftitle 18, United States Code, is
amended—(A)by striking “attempts” each time it appears and inserting “attempts or conspires”; and
(B)by inserting “, or if the object of the conspiracy had been achieved,” after “the attempted offense had
been completed”.
70
Section 19(d)(1) of title 23, United States Code, is amended by inserting, “Secretary of Homeland
Security” after Secretary of Veterans Affairs.”
71
Sections 602 and 603
72

The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin^dquery/z?dl09;SN02167;@@@R>.
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73

Patriot Act, John Sununu, with three co-sponsors. Indeed, it is no coincidence that this
legislation passed the Senate on March 1, 2006,the day before the final version of H.R.
3199 was passed. It passed out by a margin of95-4. Not surprisingly, Russ Feingold was
one of the Senators voting against the bill, and he remarked that the legislation was
74

deeply flawed.

The House, by a vote of 280-138, passed the legislation on March 7,

2006. Majority Leader John Boehner still seemed perturbed, remarking ‘“I found the
controversy over this bill the last several years interesting because basically what we did
was give law enforcement the same tools they already have to go after the mob and others
75

involved in racketeering.

Sensenbrenner went even further, declaring

Intense

congressional and public scrutiny has not produced a single substantiated claim that the
yyy

Patriot Act has been misused to violate Americans’ civil liberties.

76

Not surprisingly.

Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat from Ohio, saw things differently:‘ The Patriot Act
threatens the civil liberties of every citizen of this nation, and is full frontal assault on the
Bill of Rights and our Constitution.’....Mr. Kucinich said the act specifically violates the
»,77

First, Fourth, Fifth, Eight, and

amendments.

The Provisions of the USA Patriot Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments
Section 1, is as usual, the Short Title, and Section 2 deals with definitions.
The following three Sections(3-5) are very important to the scope ofthis thesis,
because they deal with some ofthe potentially problematic areas to be discussed in

73

The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gOv/cgi-bm/bdquery/z.dl09.s.0 16 .>.

74

Diamond, John. “Senate passes Patriot Act changes.” T ISA Today Mar. 2 2006. Newspaper Source 1
February 2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com>. See page 2.
75
Hurt, Charles. “House OKs disputed provisions of Patriot Act.” Washington Times, The(DC)Mar 8.
2006. Newspaper Source 11 Febmary 2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com>.
76
Hurt, Charles. See page 2.
77
Hurt, Charles. See page 2.
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Chapter 3. The official titles of these three sections, respectively, are Judicial Review of
FISA Orders, Disclosures, and Privacy Protection for Library Patrons. As reported by
Doyle and Yeh, this bill seeks to “provide civil liberties safeguards not included in the
J8

conference report.

These concessions to civil liberties include:

Recipients of secret court orders to turn over sensitive information on individuals
linked to terrorism investigations are not allowed to disclose those orders but can
challenge the gag order after a year...Libraries, including those that offer Internet
access, would not be required to turn over information without the approval ofa
judge...Recipients of an FBI ‘national security letter’- - an investigator’s demand
for access to personal or business information- - would not have to tell the FBI if
^
79
they consult a lawyer.

Summary
The Patriot Act passed easily in 2001. The country was prepared to give the
President whatever power was needed in order to ensure that terrorist attacks like the
ones that occurred on September 11^ would never happen again. However,the Act has
as
had a tumultuous journey since its rapid passage in 2001. Many have decried the Act
violation of civil liberties and rights. Congressional leaders were among those in the
chorus, and the clauses which called for certain provisions to sunset forced Congress to
review the legislation again. In 2006 alone, two laws were passed as an attempt of
addressing perceived problems in the original Act. In addition to both of these pieces of
legislation, the House and Senate passed bills which allowed extensions ofthe sunset
provisions while the debate was ongoing, creating Public Laws 109-160 and 109 170.
These were not comprehensive to merit a separate discussion, but it is useful to mention

See page 1.
Diamond, John. See page 2.
ojino.o
The Library of Congress. Thomas. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bm^dquery
The Library of Congress. Thomas, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bui/bdquery z.
. .r.
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them here to further emphasize the controversy that arose in these hearings. The next
Chapter will take a look at these possible defects.

34

Chapter 3
Controversial Sections

Introduction
As discussed previously, not all Sections ofthe Patriot Act have aroused
opposition by Constitutional scholars. However,the purpose ofthis chapter will be to
examine those sections which do present potential problems. Specifically, Sections 203,
206, 213, 215, 216, 218, and 505 will be discussed. The legal literature that will be
discussed is merely a small sampling ofthe material that is available on this subject.
However, these journal articles were chosen because they provided excellent substantive
information, which will aid in helping understand this legislation. The actual text ofthe
extreme
respective Sections is included as footnotes simply because most ofthem have
length. I will also refer briefly to remarks made during a Congressional hearing, as well
as to correspondence with a scholar at the First Amendment Center.

Section 203
This provision addresses information sharing among

various layers oflaw

enforcement. It has four different subsections, with each providing a barrage of material.
Jennifer Evans provides a good summary,saying it “allows law enforcement agencies to
share sensitive information gathered in criminal investigations with the CIA,NSA,and

35

other federal agencies.'^ Evans describes in detail the information sharing that is
allowed, but pinpoints Section 203(a) as being of“particular concern,” because it allows
law enforcement agencies to provide foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence
information that is revealed to a grand jury to federal intelligence agencies without a
court order.

.79

Section 203 is entitled Authority to Share Criminal Investigative

Information^^ Evans goes on to note the importance ofsecrecy in grand jury
proceedings, and reminds readers that not everyone sent to a grand jury is indicted. In

Evans, Jennifer. See page 982.
Evans, Jennifer. See page 982.
d i a:/'
(a) AUTHORITY TO SHARE GRAND JURY INFORMATION.—(0 IN GENERAL.—Rule
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended to read as follows: (C)(i)
® ^^^pcted
prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made ()^
by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;“(H) when pe^tte y a co
the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to msmss e m c
because of matters occurring before the grand jury; “(III) when the disclosure is made by an a oraey
for the government to another Federal grand jury; “(IV) when permitted by a court at e
of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a vio ation o
criminal law, to an appropriate official of a State or subdivision of a State for the purpose o e ore
such law; or “(V) when ie matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence(as e e
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947(50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence
(as
defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law enforcement, rntemgence, proiecnve
immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist th® ®
information in the performance of his official duties, “(ii)Ifthe court orders disc o^e o
,
i
occurring before the grand jury, the disclosine shall be made in such manner, at sue me,
conditions as the court may direct,“(iii) Any Federal official to whom information is isc ose
pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph may use that information only as necess^ information
that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disc
°
<5pal a notice
Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government s a i e
entities
with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the depa^en s, ag
●’
to which the disclosure was made.“(iv) In clause (i)(V) of this subpara^aph, e term
relates to the
information’ means—‘ ‘(I) information, whether or not concerning a Unite ta es
hostile acts of
ability of the United States to protect against-“(aa) actual or potential attack or other
^oshle acts of
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; “(bb) sabotage or intemationa OTorism
power or an agent of a foreign power; or “(cc) clandestine intelligence activities y
information
intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power,
( )
^
whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign
^ .
relates to—“(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States, or ( ^
~,
foreign affairs of the United States.’’.(2) CONFORMING
..v,,'”, ● ^pifna ‘TeV3VC¥il(I)”.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended by string*
(b) AUTHORITY TO SHARE ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL
INFORMATION.—(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT.-Section 2517 of title 8, Umted States Code> is
amended by inserting at the end the following: “(6) Any investigative
attorney for the Government, who by any means authorized by this chapter as o i
^
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence denved there from, may disclose such
contents to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, na lona e
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some ways, this point seems to open the door for possible harassment ofinnocent
citizens. It is feasible to imagine a situation in which someone who is been cleared ofa
crime by local authorities is then hounded by the FBI or another such organization
because of information gleaned from a grand jury hearing. Indeed, as Evans says,the
provision “blurs the role of...agencies, which were created for very different purposes.
Without appropriate safeguards, blurring or roles could lead to significant abuses of
^>81

power.

This is an important point in this type of discussion, since it could conceivably

be argued that one of the functions of the Constitution is to ensure that such abuses of

national security official to the extent that such contents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
(as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947(50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence
information (as defined in subsection(19) of section 2510 of this title), to assist the official who is to
receive that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives
information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct ofthat
person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure ofsuch information.”.(2)
DEFINITION.—Section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by—(A)in paragraph(17), by
striking “and” after tlie semicolon;(B)in paragraph (18), by striking the period and inserting and”; and
(C)by inserting at the end the following: “(19)‘foreign intelligence information’ means—“(A)
information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability ofthe United
States to protect against— ‘‘(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; “(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or “(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network ofa foreign
power or by an agent of a foreign power; or “(B)information, whether or not concerning a United States
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—“(i)the national defense or the
security of the United States; or “(ii) the conduct ofthe foreign affairs of the United States, .(c)
PROCEDURES.—The Attorney General shall establish procedures for the disclosure ofinformation
pursuant to section 2517(6) and Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that
identifies a United States person, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978(50 U.S.C. 1801)).(d)FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE NFORMATION.-(l)IN GENERAL—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
(as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947(50 U.S.C. 401a))or foreign intelligence
information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the
official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal officid who
receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary m the conduct
of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such^^
information.(2)DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term “foreign intelligence infoimation’’means—
(A)information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that re ates to the ability of the Umted
States to protect against—(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hosti e acts o a oreign power or an
agent of a foreign power;(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a oreign
power; or (iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network ofa foreign power or
by an agent of a foreign power; or(B)information, whether or not concerning a Umted States person, wft
respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to-(i)the nahonal defense or the secunty ofthe
United States; or(ii) the conduct ofthe foreign affairs ofthe United States.
See page 983.
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power by the government are not allowed to be earned out. Evans also points that liberal
sharing of information gained through grand jury investigations...circumvents...
j»82

protections, which have always been an integral part ofthe criminal justice system.
However, it is worthwhile to note that 203 is not one ofthe more widely criticized
Sections. There are a couple potential reasons for this. Critics may felt that a focused
attack on the provisions they feel the most egregious would be the best method, and thus
have allowed this section to escape condemnation. On the other hand, it maybe that
Evans is simply being overzealous. Either way,ofthe articles to be employed in this
effort, Evans’ is the only one which discusses it.

Section 206
Section 206^^ is entitled Roving Surveillance Authority under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of1978. As suggested by the name,this provision expands
the ability of the government to conduct surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, which was discussed earlier. Jeremy Smith, m no uncertain
terms, makes clear his evaluation: “The particularity requirement ofthe Fourth
Amendment requires that the [Supreme] Court void Section 206’s authorization ofroving
to intrude
wiretaps. Section 206 gives the federal government excessively broad authority
»84

on the privacy of third parties...

Therefore, Smith is not merely questioning the

validity of the Congressional action, he is actively calling for a ruling of

“Section 105(c)(2)(B) ofthe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
amended by inserting
or in circumstances where the Court finds that Ae ac ons o
application may have the effect of thwarting the identification ofa specific person,sue

“
ripronns ”

Patnot Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations ofPrivacy P^ted^
Fourth Amendment without Advancing National Security.” North Carolina Law eview
2003) 412-455. See page 421.
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unconstilutionality by the Supreme Court. However, as Smith himself acknowledges, the
federal government sees this Section in a different light: “Attorney General John Ashcroft
has asserted that roving wiretaps do not violate the particularity requirement because the
wiretaps have particularity of person.”^^ However, as suggested by Smith s strong
wording against this Section, some scholars believe the problem lies in the abihty ofthird
parties’ privacy rights to be manipulated and abused. Apparently Congress heard at least
some of these concerns, because, as alluded to previously, greater oversight was provided
for the monitoring of this Section during the revision hearings, and it was scheduled to
86

sunset at the conclusion of the year 2009.

Section 213
87

Section 213, Authorityfor Delaying Notice ofthe Execution of a Warrant, has
drawn widespread outrage from Constitutional scholars. This is the provision which
provides for the sneak-and-peek search warrants which were previously alluded to. It
allows for searches to be carried out without immediately notifying the individual whose
possessions are being searched. Smith points out that this Section provides broad
authority” for the delayed notice, and also he states Alarmingly,[it] authorizes such

See page 417
Doyle, Charles and Brian T. Yeh. See page 3
^
at
Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended—(1)by inserting ^
,
before ‘‘In addition”; and(2) by adding at the end the following: “(b)DELAY.
i re^ec
issuance of any warrant or court order under this section, or any other rule of
f
any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in vio afton o
, court
United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to be given may e e aye i
finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execu on o e
may have an adverse result(as defined in section 2705);“(2) the warrant pro ite e seizur
tangible property, any wire or electronic communication(as defined in section
), or, exc p
expressly provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic information, except w ere e
finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and (3)the warrant provides for the givmg of such notice
within a reasonable period of its execution, which period may thereafter be extended by the court for good
cause shown.”.
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searches not only in terrorist investigations but also in general criminal investigations.
Evans also finds this Section objectionable, and provides additional details about how
it functions. She points out that, “The court has the authority to delay notice when it
finds reasonable cause to delay...The statute does not, however, define reasonable
cause..

Because of factors such as these, Evans feels that this Section ultimately
90

violates privacy rights stemming jfrom the Fourth Amendment.
Susan Herman provides further commentary: “Having an opportumty to view the
search warrant gives the target a chance to point out any mistakes perhaps the address is
»91

wrong—and to ensure that the search does not exceed the scope authorized,

Herman

also offers information regarding the use of this tool by law enforcement,saying The
deferred notice authority was used 153 times between enactment and January 31,2005.
„92

Only eighteen of those uses were in terrorism investigations,

This is a very important

point, since the supposed aim of this legislation was to, in fact, fight terrorism. Also, as
discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis, public opinion should have some bearing
on this discussion, since the legitimacy of the government depends upon the acquiescence
of the citizenry to the laws. In this regard also, Herman has some disconcerting
93

information: “Seventy-one percent of those [Americans] surveyed [by Gallup]
disapproved of allowing agents to search a home secretly, and for an unspecified period
of time, not to inform the person of that search.

Therefore, it may seem contradictory

that a bill meant to make Americans feel safer could instead potentially make them fear

88

See page 435.
See page 973.
90
See page 974.
91
Herman, Susan. See page 100.
92
Seepage 100.
n
93
Saad, Lydia. “Americans Generally Comfortable with Patriot Act.” The Gallup Organization. 2004.
94
See page 101.
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the power of law enforcement ofYicers in addition to fearing terrorists. Herman concedes
that the conference report from the revision hearings “proposed some time lumts”,but
»95

qualifies this information by claiming‘^e limits were...elastic and subject to renewal.

Section 215
Section 215 is named Access to Records and Other Items under the Foreign
Intelligence Sur\’eillance Act. As discussed previously, this was one ofthe most vastly
revised sections during the 2005-06 hearings. That alone should indicate that the public
was cognizant of various issues that arose with its use. Herman helps sort through the
technical language^^ by describing some of the features made possible by this Section,

See page 102.
Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(50 U.S.C. 1861 et seqO^
striking sections 501 through 503 and inserting the following: “SEC.
TT?i?Dm>Tcx>r
BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
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INVESTIGATIONS, “(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau ofInvwtigation or a designee ofthe
Director(whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in arge) may m e an app ca on
for an order requiring the production of any tangible things(including boo ,recor ,papers, ocumen s,
and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terronsm or c an es erne 8®®ce
activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not con uc e so e y
®
of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. (2)^
\^ ^
this section shall—“(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by ie
Order 12333 (or a successor order); and “(B)not be conducted of a Hm e
P
^ y P°^^ ®
basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution o e ni
‘ ^
application under Uiis section- “(1)shall be made to-“(A)a judge ofthe court
sechon
103(a); or “(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of title 28, Urn e S es Code, who is
publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have the P°^®^ ®
of
a
grant orders for the production of tangible things under this section on e a
J
mndnrtpH ● ’^
“(2)shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorize
^
.
r,
o
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence infoim ion
“/vvmT^
^
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
. ( X ) POti an
application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte or gt^reques e ,or as
modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds that
,for
^°
this section. ‘‘(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose tha i i
investigation described in subsection (a), “(d)
those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under tnis se
Investigation has sought or obtained tangible

J
j

J

“^„"otbe liable to any other pLn for

proceeding or context.“SEC. 502. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ^
>>^s.s the
Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select Cor^ e
g
ouse of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the ena e concemmg a requests for the
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saying it “authorizes the government to acquire records and tangible things from
custodians—including educational or financial institutions, Internet service providers, or
»97

even indigent librarians—under a court order,

Herman then discusses the main

problems that people find with this, saying it “allegedly violates Fourth Amendment
principles of antecedent review by not requiring a court to find individualized suspicion
before issuing the order,” and “the gag order allegedly violates the Fourth Amendment
because...it does provide for notice to the target...the potential safeguard of...invok[ing]
„98

judicial review of any sort is eliminated.

Herman’s first point is echoed by Jeremy

Smith, who argues that it is “unconstitutional in that it eliminates the reasonable
suspicion type standard and extends FISA to ‘United States persons’ contrary to the
purpose of FISA and the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.”^^ He also notes that the
“automatic access to records based on a certification that they are sought to ‘protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities’” is a “fundamental
100

shift” in the law.

Smith, in his writing, seems to be inserting these quotes from the Act

in almost sarcastic way, in order to further reiterate his distaste for the provision.
This is an area in which First Amendment concerns also appear, because ofthe
fear of a chilling effect. Paul McMasters,the chief ombudsmen at The First Amendment
Center, made clear in e-mail correspondence*®^ that he believes the monitoring oflibrary
records could create a chilling effect. As discussed previously, a chilling effect is, in

production of tangible things under section 402. “(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall
provide to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report setting
forth with respect to the preceding 6-month period— “(1)the total number ofapplications made for orders
approving requests for the production of tangible things under section 402; and “(2)the total number of
such orders either granted, modified, or denied.”
97
See pages 75-76.
98
See page 78.
99
See page 423.
100
See page 422.
101
I corresponded with Mr. McMasters via e-mail on December 21* and 22 ,2006.
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essence, any law which unreasonably deters an act that is protected by the First
Amendment. In an article wTitten by McMasters, he makes a similar point, saying
“Critics charge that government agents can use this power to paw through the library
»102

loans or bookstore purchase records of ordinary Americans,

This rekindles a point

which has been discussed several times in this thesis: many opponents ofthis Act contend
that the legislation was not focused enough on terrorist activity, and this provision
certainly falls under that category in their estimation. Herman also provides information
about the use of Section 215 in practice, saying “Figures about [its] use...do not provide
an accurate gage of how frequently the government has sought records from librarians

or

other custodians of records...if custodians voluntary turn over requested records, no court
,»103

order is necessary.

In this point, Herman discusses the uses of Section 505, which will

be outlined in later pages. In summation. Section 215 is one that has drawn ire from a
rather wide range of sources, and is one of the more infamous parts ofthe Act.
Importantly, during the reauthorization hearings, the Congress,just as with Section 206,
provided for “greater congressional and judicial oversight’

and scheduled it to “sunset at

„104

the end of 2009.

Section 216
Section 216 has a lot to do with the monitoring of various electromc
communications, such as e-mail. It is entitled Modification ofAuthorities Relating to
105

Use ofPen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices,

102

This does several important things:

McMasters,Paul. “Patriot Act is Exhibit A on the risk ofsecrecy. August
<www.firstamendmentcenter.org>.
103
See page 79.
104
Doyle, Charles and Brian T. Yeh. See page 1.
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.

ecem er

105

(a) GENER.A.L LIMITATIONS.—Section 3121(c) of title 18,United States Code, is amended—(l)by
inserting “or trap and trace device” after “pen register”;(2)by inserting “,routing, addressing,” after
“dialing”; and (3) by striking “call processing” and inserting “the processing and transmitting of wire or
electronic commumcations so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications”,
(b)ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.—(1)IN GENERAL—Section 3123(a)of tide 18, United States Code,is
amended to read as follows:“(a) IN GENERAL.—“(1)ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT.—^Upon
an application made under section 3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the
installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States, ifthe court
finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be
obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The order, upon
service of that order, shall apply to any person or entity providing wire or electronic commumcation service
in the United States whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order. Whenever such an order is
served on any person or entity not specifically named in the order, upon request ofsuch person or entity,
the attorney for the Government or law enforcement or investigative officer that is serving the order shall
provide vvTitten or electronic certification that the order applies to the person or entity being served. (2)
STATE INVESTIGATIVE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER.—Upon an application made under
section 3122(a)(2), the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen
register or trap and trace device within the jurisdiction of the court, if the court finds that the State law
enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by
such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.* (3)(A) Where &e aw
enforcement agency implementing an ex parte order under this subsection seeks to do so by ms
g an
using its own pen register or trap and trace device on a packet-switched data network ofa provider of
electronic communication service to the public, the agency shall ensure that a record
e iMmtame
which will identify—**(i) any officer or officers who installed the device and any officer or officers who
accessed the device to obtain information from the network; **(ii) the date and time the evice tos
installed, the date and time the device was uninstalled, and the date, time, and duration o eac
e e
device is accessed to obtain information; **(iii) the configuration ofthe device at the time o i ms a a on
and any subsequent modification thereof; and **(iv) any information which has een co ec e ^ ®
device. To the extent that the pen register or trap and trace device can be set automa ica y
use
information electronically, the record shall be maintained electronically
of such device. **(B) The record maintained under subparagraph(A)shall be provi
p
within
seal to the court which entered the ex parte order authorizing the
qF ORDER.—
30 days after termination of the order (including any extensions thereof). ●( )
in«:ertine
Section 3123(b)(1) of title 18,United States Code, is amended^A) in f
* ‘or other facility” after “telephone line”; and (ii) by inserting before the
attributes of the
applied"; and (B) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting
and. if known, the
communications to which the order applies, includmg the number ®
,
device is to be
location of the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or
,
device
attached or applied, and, in the case of an order authorizing “on
under subsection (a)(2), the geographic limits of the
amended-(A) by insetting “or
REQUIREMENTS.-Section 3123(d)(2) of title I8. Umted Smtes^ode,«^^^^^^^^^^y^^^^^^^
other facility” after “the line”; and (B) by striking .or who hash
“or applied, or who is obligated by the order”, (c) DEFINITIONS.— ( )
oniking subparagraph

IUIuI^ICTION.-Sect.on3127(2)oftitle 18. United S«.es code.srf

(A) and inserting the following: “(A) any district court of the Umted
t
such a court) or any U nited States court of appeals having
. j amended— (A) by striking
or”.(2) PEN REGISTER.-Section 3127(3) oftitle 18. unite
“electronic or other impulses” and all that follows through
atu
g„j„„i,ich a wire or
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an mstruineni o
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, tnai s
..<jevice” each place it appears,
contents of any communication”; and (B) by insertmg “or proces
amended-(A) by
(3) TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE.-Section 3127(4) of htle 18, Untfed s
striking “of an instmment” and all that follows
a
or
routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably liKW
^ ^^j^jants of any
electronic communication, provided, however, that such iniormauu
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“It expanded the definition of a pen register...[and]allows for nationwide pen register
orders and creates reporting requirements on the use of government-installed pen
106

registers.

Jeremy Smith provides further information about the expanding authority of

pen register statutes, saying they “had applied only to telephone information’ but that the
right of“the federal government to track Internet usage and e-mail communications” was
added. However, as Ditzion points out, there are many parts ofthis provision which do
not provide accurate enough definitions to ensure that law enforcement will not have
overbroad authority for interpretation. For example, he believes that the language in the
Act does not provide enough information about what constitutes “‘content’ and
,,,107

‘routing.

As pointed in the article, this is an important difference, because the

warrant requirements for actual content are more stringent under the current
understanding of the law. Ditzion argues that courts and lawmakers need to clarify this
distinction, and he also contends that because “people have a higher expectation of
„108

privacy in pen register material on the Internet than is currently provided,

Because of

this point, one could also possibly view this Section as creating a chilling effect. If people
are scared to go about the legal activities they normally would on the internet, then that
could constitute a chilling effect. For example,ifsomeone is intimidated by the law and
thus is prevented from exercising their Constitutional freedom ofspeech in e-mail, a
chilling effect might be taking place. Ditzion provides excellent commentary in his

communication;”; and(B)by inserting “or process” after “a device”.(4)CONFORMING
AMENDMENT.—Section 3127(1)of title 18, United States Code, is amended—(A)by striking “and”;
and(B)by inserting
and ‘contents’ ” after “electronic communication service”.(5) TECHNICAL
AMENDMENT.—Section 3124(d) of title 18, United States Code,is amended by striking “the terms of’.
(6) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 3124(b)of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting “or other facility” after “the appropriate line”.
106
Ditzion, Robert. See pages 1334-1335.
107
See page 1335.
108
See page 1351.
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summary, saying “The laws currently governing pen registers, while roughly correct in
principle, need to be updated to reflect both the new technical realities and the new
»109

societal understandings of privacy,

Jeremy Smith also takes issue with this Section,

saying it “is unconstitutional on two alternate theories. First, the Fourth Amendment
protects all electronic communications...Second...for all practical purposes it is
no
impossible to monitor non-content without violating the privacy of content.

Section 218
Section 218,

Foreign Intelligence Information^ is concerned with a subject

similar to that of Section 216. It “expands the power ofthe government to conduct
electronic surveillance instead of proceeding under the more demanding
,,112

standgirds...which covers criminal investigations,

Herman provides further

information, stating that this was:
A major expansion of the government’s authority to conduct surveillance. The
government now only needs to persuade the FISA court that there is probable
cause to believe that the target is an ‘agent of a foreign power, ra er an
persuading a regular court that there is probable cause to believe that the targe is
involved in criminal activity.^
Jeremy Smith gives additional insight into this provision, saying, as a result ofthis
Section, “The federal government can obtain a FISA court order absent probable cause
when the primary purpose ofthe surveillance is criminal investigation, provided that

109

no

See page 1352.

111

Sections 104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B)(50 U.S.C.1804(a)(7)(B)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking
“a significant purpose”.
112
Herman, Susan. See page 92.
113
See pages 92-93.
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1823(a)(7)(B)) of the
e purpose an mse g

In other words, Smith seems

gathering foreign intelligence is a ‘significant purpose,

to imply that the potential for abuse could be potentially very disturbing. Jennifer Evans
also comments, writing about this Section “lessening the burden of proofthe government
»,115

must demonstrate in order to obtain a FISA warrant.

Susan Herman provides

information about the use of this provision: “According to Attorney General Gonzales,
the government has submitted seventy-four percent more apphcations to the FISA court
y,\l6

since the Patriot Act was enacted, all of which have been granted,

This figure

certainly suggests that the court may be reluctant to quash the government s requests.
Herman identifies the “principal Constitutional challenge” to this provision as the
idea “that electronic surveillance should not be permitted in the absence of a more
»117

traditional judicial finding of probable cause.

Smith provides even stronger wording:
118

99
(4

Section 218 is not amendable to reform or modification and is unconstitutional.

He

also remarks, “Courts cannot let section 218 be used to permit warrantless wuetaps m
ordinary criminal investigations beyond the scope ofterrorist exigency that prompted the
119

99

wireless wiretaps in the first place.

Evans joins the chorus, remarking that, “this

amendment allows the FBI to conduct...a wiretap primarily to obtain evidence of a cnme
120

99

without proving probable cause, violating the Fourth Amendment,

So, although they

all may voice their concerns in slightly different language, the Constitutional scholars
referenced here find this provision to be very unsettling.

114

See page 424.
See page 972.
116
See page 94.
117
See page 93.
118
See page 435.
119
See page 435.
120
See page 975.
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Section 505
Section 505

i:i

is named Miscellaneous National Security Authorities. Unlike

some of the other provisions which have been discussed,just looking at the title does not
give much information as to what is contained therein. This maybe a strategic move on
the part of Congress, since the authority dealt with here is similar to that of Section 215.

121

(a)TELEPHONE TOLL AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS.—Section 2709(b)oftitle 18, United
States Code, is amended—(1) in the matter preceding paragraph(1), by inserting ^ B^eau headquarters
or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director a er Assistam
Director”;(2) in paragraph (1)—(A)by striking “in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director”;
and(B)by striking “made that" and all that follows and inserting the following: made that the name,
address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are relevant to an au orae mvesh^bon to
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provi e a sue aii
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis o activi
pro ecte y e
fust amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and”;and(3)“
^ ^^ , S
“in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director”; and(B)by striking ma e a an 1 that
follows and inserting the following:‘‘made that the information sought is re evant to an au onze
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine mte igence ac vi es,prwi e
t
such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted
by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”.
'
A a
1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978(12 U.S^C.
inserting “in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director
Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director a er
8
’
^ ^ ^®
S
“sought” and all that follows and inserting “sought for foreign counter in e g
P^invecriLri
f
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provi ®
first amendmpntt^
United Statesperson is not conducted solely upon the basis of"pro ec^
the Constitute of the United States.”,(c)C^SUMER I^PORT^Sechon^^^^^^^^^
Reporting Act(15 U.S.C. 1681 u) is amended—(1)in subsection
j ^ ^^
Bureau
lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Sp
^
j
t.field office de^^ed by the Director” after “designee” the
P
%’v^Ktsuc^
'
“
writing that-’ and all that follows through the end
“protect against international
mfomrntton is sought for the conduct of an authorized ^«*tiga
instigation ofa United States person
terrorism or clandestme intelhgence activities,provided tW such
Constitution of
IS not conducted solely upon the basis of activities
P™‘“'““^“ jjion not lower than Deputy Assistant
the United States ”,(2)in subsection(bWA)by insemng^
Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent m Charge oi
_
^
Director” after'‘designee” die firstplace it appears; and(B by
follows through the end and inserting the following:
“!"^nal teiroiismor clandestine intelligence
conduct of an authorized mvestigation to protect agaiMt
i^em
8^^
activities, provided that such an investigation of a Umted
P „(,f the United States.”; and(31'm
basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Consn
subsection(c>—(A)by inserting ‘‘in a position not lower
^ jgnated by the Director” after
headquarters or a Special Agent m Charge in a Bureau fteld on
^
_
__
“designee of the Director”; and(B)by striking “in
c”*'"*
nought for the conduct of an auftorized
and inserting the following; m camera that the “"suroer rePort
“
investigation to protect against mtemahonal terronsm or clatio
of activities nmw..a
such an investigation of a United States person is not conducte ^
protected
by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
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Herman declares “It allows the government to obtain records from a commumcations
provider by issuing its own administrative subpoena, called a National Security
Letter.

Herman further identifies the potential targets, which include “telephone
»123

companies, Internet service providers, and libraries with computer terminals.

In

Herman’s critique, she does not seem very fond ofthis provision, remarking Section 505
goes even further than Section 215 in circumventing judicial oversight ofthe
124

government’s collection of information from third party custodians,

Furthermore, she

also notes that Congressional oversight is limited: “The FBI is required to report to
Congress twice a year on the use of this authority, but the scope ofthe obligation is vague
and members of Congress complained publicly that the reports were not always
125

submitted properly.

This is a somewhat surprising remark, since Congress is the body

responsible for the legislation. Therefore, it would likely behoove the FBI to follow the
proper protocol, in order to prevent their power from being taken away. Herman provides
further information on the power of this Section, saying that it has a ^broadly worded
44

44

nondisclosure provision”, and that it dispenses with any showing ofindividualized
»126

suspicion and any form of antecedent judicial review.

It is also useful to examine the

Congressional debates in 2005, since this was one ofthe provisions discussed, at least in
some in the subcommittee hearings. In fact. Representative Robert Scott, a Congressman
from Virginia, voices concerns similar to those raised by Herman. Scott remarks
44

Records sought under this provision do not have to pertain to a foreign power...thus the

122

See page 86.
See page 86.
124
See page 86.
125
See page 88.
126
See page 87.
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-.-vn
ers.

confidcnlialily of records can ccl up in such[Xanon^

)^n
ffowcKcfr, i'rt/T

discusses the court uclion thut )ms JoDowCi
save discussion regarding litigation forlher\ewC\\tiplet. \Us also worth
similar fashion to Section 215, Section 505 may present the possibility ofa chdiing
effect.

Summar>VConclusion
Sections 203. 206. 213. 215. 216, 218, and 505 of the initial Patriot Act have
drawn widespread criticism from Constitutional scholars. These scholars believe that the
aforementioned provisions violate the civil liberties of Americans. Most of the criticism
is mounted in tcmis of the Fourth Amendment, although a much smaller subset of\oices
complains about First Amendment issues. However, despite such criticisms, the Act
received very little modification from the Congress in the reauthorization hearincS.
Because of the legislative branch’s apparent unwillingness to address the issues that
an active role in
concern many scholars and citizens, it appears the judiciary will have
deciding on the Constitutionality of this legislation. For that reason, the following
Chapter will examine action that has been taken by the judiciary in relation to this Act
specifically. It will also examine more general Court actions around the war on teaor,
and national security in general.
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United States. Cong. House. Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
°
2"*^
Judiciary, Hearing on the Implementation of Ilie USA Pairint Act: Sections 50 an _—.■
'
sess. Washington: GPO, 2005. 13 September 2006 <http://0-web.lexisnexis.com.umiss.lib.olemi .
128
See pages 80-01 .
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Chapt er4
The Judiciary and its Role

Introduction
Although the Patriot Act has met the approval of Congress and the President, it
must past muster with the third branch of government before its place in the American
system of government is secure. In Chapter 1,1 discussed the debate over civil liberties
and national security, and which holds more weight. It will be worthwhile to briefly
return to that discussion here, since that debate will likely play an important role in the
judiciary’s consideration of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality ofthe Patriot Act.
As has been seen throughout this thesis, many lawyers and civil libertanans argue
that portions of the Act infringe unnecessarily on the civil liberties of Americans.
Whether or not I agree with this point will be discussed in Chapter 5. However,even if it
is assumed that the Act does, in fact, intrude upon the rights of citizens ofthe United
are not
States, it remains important to remember even constitutionally guaranteed rights
absolute. As will be seen in this chapter, the Supreme Court has, in the past, permitted
certain exceptions to various rights and liberties in the name of national security.
However, at other times the Supreme Court, and lower courts all across the country, have
intervened and made clear that the steps undertaken by government

in the name of

security go too far in violating these rights. Because ofthe relatively recent passage and
cases
enforcement of the Patriot Act, the judicial branch has had few chances to examine

51

related to it. On the broader subject of the war on terrorism generally, there have been a
few more opportunities for the judiciary to make rulings. It is worth stopping here to
make a very important point: courts are passive institutions. Courts cannot simply address
issues or laws they feel are problematic. Instead, they must wait for someone to present
the problem by petitioning a court for redress of grievances. This can occur in various
ways, but it must happen before they get involved. The following sections will cover a
range of cases which have involved national security and civil liberties. They will follow
in chronological order, meaning the cases most closely related to the Act and to the

war

on terror will come at the end of the discussion. The cases which have been chosen for
examination have a similar theme: they all relate to national security and civil liberties.
The historical cases which are included are identified by casebooks such as the one
written by Epstein and Walker to be among the most important cases in the debate
between civil liberties and national securities. Moreover, many include challenges
against the government based on the First or Fourth Amendments. Obviously, this is an
important point, since it relates back to the original research question.

Schenck v. United States (1919)
Schenck was decided by the United States Supreme Court. Schenck was charged
with violating the Espionage Act of 1917, by
causing and attempting to cause insubordination, &c.,in the military and naval
forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting and en istmen service o
the United States, when the United States was at war with the German Empire..
conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, to-wit, to use e
for the transmission of matter declared to be non-mailable...un aw Y using,
mails for the transmission of the same matter and otherwise as a ove.
127

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 1919. 12 Feb. 2007 <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/

getcase.pl?court=us&vol= 249&invol=47>. See page 1.
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Schenck’s attorney did not contend the charge that his client had violated this law, but
128

instead argued the Espionage Act was a violation ofthe First Amendment,

In

affirming the lower court, and thus upholding Shenck’s conviction, Justice Holmes,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated: “When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by
129

any Constitutional right.

This opinion, in other words,frankly states that the

government may limit constitutional freedoms in times of war. Therefore, it has been
clear from an early period that the Court does not regard the guarantees included m the
Bill of Rights as absolute.

Abrams v. United States (1919)
This case was decided by the United States Supreme Court. Under the Espionage
Act, five men were convicted of“conspiring, when the United States was at war with the
Imperial Government of Germany to unlawfully utter, print, write, and publish...
various sentiments against the government ofthe United States, including dending the
system of government itself, trying to make the government appear disgraceful, and
encouraging citizens not to support the war effort,

These men were convicted ofa

lower court on these charges, and they based their appeal to the Supreme Court on First
Amendment rights. However,the decisions of guilt were upheld by the Supreme Court.
Thus it is clear not only that some evidence but that much persuasive evidence
128
129

Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker, see page 217.
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Abrams v. Unhed States, 250 U. S. 616, 1919 15 Jan. 2007 <http://caselaw.lp.fmdlaw.com/scnpts/
getcase.pl?court=\is&vol=250&invol=616>.
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was before the jur>’ lending to prove that the defendants were guilty as charged in
both the third and fourth counts of the indictment and under the long established
rule of law hereinbefore stated the judgment ofthe District Court must be
affirmed.
Another important point of the case caii be taken from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
dissent, in which he stales the power of the government to limit speech, ‘undoubtedly is
greater in times of w ar than in times of war because war opens dangers that do not exist
at other times.

Tliis statement is important for two reasons. First, Holmes was

conceding the power of the government to act, yet still believed it had gone too far.
Holmes had written the opinion in Schenck not long before this case arose, which clearly
demonstrates that he was not a crazed civil libertarian. Second,the type ofargument
employed here is similar to the ones the government today relies onto justify their
actions in regard to limiting civil liberties. However,it is also important to remember that
Holmes’ opinion does not set precedent. In addition, these men were not citizens, and had
not even begun naturalization proceedings, even though they each had been in the United
States for a range of 5 to 10 years.

Gitlow V. New York(1925)
The United States Supreme Court was the venue for the decision m Gitlow. The
laws that Gitlow was charged with violating were New York Penal Code 160 and
132

161.1.

The state indicted him on:

two counts. The first charged that the defendant had advocated, advised and
taught the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing an o^^rturmng
organized government by force, violence and imlaw means, y certain
writings...the second that he had printed, publishe an
owing y circulated and
131
132

Gitlow V. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 1925. 15 Feb. 2007 <http://caselaw.lp.fmdlaw.coni/scripts/
getcase.pl? court=us&vol^268&invol=652>. See page 1-
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distributed a certain paper called The Revolutionary Age,'...advising and
teaching the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force,
violence and unlawful means.
As reported by the Court's opinion, Gitlow was found guilty ofthese charges in the
Supreme Court of New ^'ork and the ruling was affirmed both in the “Appellate
134

Division” and the Court of Appeals, leading him to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Gitlow’s attorney argued that the statutes constituted a violation of his First Amendment
135

right to expression, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,

However,

in the ruling, the Justices were not convinced. In upholding Gitlow s conviction, the
Court concluded:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom ofspeec an o
the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute ngn o
speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or m
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use ol
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
Therefore, this case provides yet another example ofthe Court ruling against individual
freedoms in the name of national security. Epstein and Walker,in their analysis ofthe
opinion, conclude that the effect on civil liberties “is somewhat mixed because the
ruling “expanded constitutional guarantees for freedom ofexpression by apply[mg
,137

This is a

them] to state and local governments" but it “also limited personal freedom.
very valid point, but the important point here is that a man was
not for carrying out an action, but for advocating one.
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found guilty by the Court,

Toyosaburo Korcmaisu \\ L'mtcd States(1944)
This is N et another case in which the Supreme Court issued a very important
ruling. Korcmatsu was arrested for refusal to follow an edict calling for him to leave his
138

home on the West Coast and go to an internment camp,

In Justice Black’s opinion, he

makes clear that the rationale for doing so is national security:“We are at war with the
Japanese Empire...military' authorities feared an invasion ofour West Coast... the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens ofJapanese ancestry be
,.139

segregated from the West Coast,

Therefore,the Courtjustified making people leave

their homes based solely on their ethnicity. From this case, it can be seen with great
clarity that the Court has, in the past, allowed for the civil liberties ofcitizens to be
limited in the name of national safety. In addition, this decision singled out a group
merely for their ethnicity. Therefore, it is possible to imagine citizens being punish
merely because of religious affiliation. Justices are supposed to be immune from public
pressure, but it would certainly seem that they gave in to public hysteria in is

g

ruling.

Dennis v. United States (1951)

Dennis provides another Supreme

Court decision relating to civil liberties and

national security. The petitioners were indicted and found guilty in federal district court
for violating the Smith Act, by:
conspiring(1) to organize as the Communist Party a group of pereoM to teach and
advocate the Lerthrow and destmction ofthe Government oftheUmted
by

-Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,1944. 17 Jan. 2007 <http://caselaw.lp.

!'‘?“uarteT'3^^^
getcase.pl?court=ois&vol=341&invol=494>. See page 5.
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force and \ iolence. and (2) knowingly and \sillfiilly to advocate and teach the
duty and necessity of o\erthrowing and destroying the Government ofthe United
Stales by force and violence.'"*^
In addition, their convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeals.

According to the

Court, the appeal argued that the Smith Act presented a violation ofthe freedom of
speech guaranteed in the First .Amendment, and that the Act s indefimteness violated the
First and Fifth Amendments.

However, the justices flatly rejected this rationale:

Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial
enough interest for the Go\ emment to limit speech...Their conspiracy to organize
the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow ofthe Government
of the United States by force and violence created a "clear and present danger" of
an attempt to overtlirow the Government by force and violence. They were
properly and constitutionally convicted for violation ofthe Smith Act.
As noted by Epstein and Walker, this was a very important opinion, because ^Venms
served as a benchmark in other areas of the law in which the federal government asked
the Court for sweeping powers to investigate the Communist Party, other subversive
144

groups, and their alleged adherents.

This point should immediately bring to mind

many of the acts currently being undertaken with the USA Patriot Act. It is true that
terrorists are not the same as members of a political party. However,this mling presents a
clear endorsement by the Court that certain groups can be given extra attention for their
political beliefs, especially if those

beliefs advocate a violent overthrow ofthe

government. Therefore, it is conceivable to imagine the Court allowing some restrictions
on the civil liberties of perceived terrorists.
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Humanitarian La\\ Project r. John Ashcroft(2004)
The United Stales District Court for the Central District of California was the
location for this leual challenge. The reason including this non-Supreme Court case is
simple^ the Supreme Court has yet to react to the USA Patriot Act. This suit deals with
Section 805 of the Patriot Act, which was not discussedby any ofthe law journal articles
that were reviewed in Chapter 3. Along with Sections 302 and 303 ofthe Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, Section 805 “prohibit[s] the provision of material
support, including ‘expert advice or

assistance,’ to designated foreign terrorist

organizations.>>145 Although this case does not include one ofthe sections discussed in
Chapter 3, it is an important case to review, since the plaintiffs’ argument centered on an
argument of violation of First and Fifth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sued because
they sought, through a request for summary judgment,to be allowed “to provide support
to the lawful, nonviolent activities” of groups that had previously been designated as
146

terrorist organizations,

The government sought to have the case dismissed “for lack of
147

justiciability”^ an argument which Judge Audrey Collins flatly rejected.

After

dispensing of that legal matter. Judge Collins focused upon the substantive nature ofthe
plaintiffs’

challenge, saying:

p.

„rr.hibition on providing expert advice and assistance is
argue that the p
g^i^gtantially overbroad. Second,they contend that
h impermissibly vague
Amendments by criminalizing
prohibition violates the Firs
r^|*jjjtentto incite imminent violence or to
ssociational speech withou P
, they assert that the prohibition on
^PPort a group’s illegal en
^ violates the First and Fifth Amendments
P^’oviding expert advice and assistanc
"
^hn Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185,2004.2 Feb. 2007 <http://0web.lexis-n
^
Project v. John
j
See Da'o ^’^^^●^^m umiss.lib.olerniss.edu/
147 r,
Udge 3_
See
P^ges 8-9
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because ii uranis ihe Secretarx' of State imreviewable authority to designate
groups as foreign terrorist organizations.
Collins, in recognizing the rights given to citizens by the First Amendment, agreed that
the language xx as too x ague.’*’'^ Collins ruled against the plaintiffs in regard to the
1 50

remaining arguments

Howex er, this remained somewhat of axdctory for cixdl

libertarians, because it xxas the first time any portion ofthe Patriot Act was found to be
unconstitutional.

Hamdi v. Rumsfield(2004)
The Supreme Court was the venue for this case. They received the case on appeal
151

from the Fourth Circuit,

The petitioner, Yesar Esam Hamdi, an American citizen bom
464

in Louisiana, was designated as an
4>

with the Taliban,

152

enemy combatant’” for “allegedly taking up arms

Hamdi’s father sued on his behalf, alleging that the government was
153

in violation of, among things, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

Because ofthis

label, “The government contends...holding him in the United States indefinitely
without formal charges or proceedings—unless and imtil it makes the determination that
access to counsel or further process is warranted.

The lower court had ruled against

Hamdi. They had reached this conclusion partly because ofa resolution passed by
Congress, the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which called for the President to

148
149
150
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See pages 14-16.
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155

use ‘“all necessary and appropriate force"’ in stopping terrorism,

However, the justices

of the Supreme Court fell differently, concluding “The threats to military operations
posed by a basic s\ stem of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizens
core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an
impartial adjudicator.

Therefore, the Court made clear that it is unwilling to give the

administration a complete blank check.

Rasul V. Bush (2004)
The Supreme Court received this case on appeal from the District Court for the
District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals; both ofthese courts had ruled against the
petitioners.’"'^ The petitioners were “2 Australians and 12 Kuwaitis captured abroad”
158

during the United States engagement in Afghamstan.

The Supreme Court’s summary

of the prior court action states:
Petitioners filed suits
_
its under
federal law challenging the legality oftheir detenhon
alleging that they had never been combatants against the United States or engaged
in terrorist acts, and that they have never been
\ rp,
permitted to consult counsel, or provided access to courts or o er
want
District Court construed the suits as habeas petitions and dismisse
159
ofjurisdiction.
The key issue, obviously, was whether or not district courts have jurisdiction over the
habeas corpus petitions filed by detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The Supreme Court
disagreed with the interpretation by the lower courts: “United States courts h
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention offoreign

155
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See pages 3-6.
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»I60

captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay.
The confusion about jurisdiction raises a worthwhile idea to consider in regard to much
of the anti-terror legislation: the government has not really found itself with this type of
issue on its hands before. -As suggested by the lower courts rulings in this case, there is
potential for uncertainty in the judiciary about their proper role. Ifthis continues to prove
true in the future, it will likely be left for tlie Supreme Court to decide.

Doe V. Ashcroft(2004)
Doe V. Ashcroft is a case tliat was heard in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. As with the lower court case that was included earher,
this is a worthwhile inclusion because it discussed the USA Patriot Act. The lead
»16I

plaintiff was “an internet access firm that received anNSL.

The Court’s analysis,

provided by Judge Victor Marrero, also states “Doe has not complied with the NSL
»162

request, and has instead engaged counsel to bring the present lawsuit,

The plaintiffs

argued that the “broad subpoena power violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments
of the United States Constitution, and that the non-disclosure provision violates the Fifth
Amendment,

163

J udge Marrero ruled Section 505 ofthe USA Patriot Act to be

unconstitutional:
The Court concludes that § 2709 violates the Fourth Amendment because, at least
as currently applied, it effectively bars or substantially deters myjudicial
challenge to the propriety of an NSL request. In the Court’s view,ready
availability ofjudicial process to purse such a challenge is necessary to vindicate
important rights guaranteed by the Constitution or ysa e. n separate
grounds, the Court also concludes that the permanent ban on disclosure...operates
160
161

Do7v" Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 2004. 25 October 2006 <http://0.web.lexis.nexis.com.umiss.
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as an unconsiiiuiional prior restraint on speech in violation ofthe First
1(»4
Amendment.
As can be seen from the text above, Marrero s ruling actually refers to 18 U. S. C.§
2709, but this w as amended by Section 505, and it is partly these changes which are
being protested. Although his finding was later vacated and remanded by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2006 (this will be discussed later), it is
still certainly \s orthwhile to review the reasoning underlying the decision-making here, as
it may come up again in the future. As stated in the opinion. In short, the Patriot Act
removed the previous requirement that § 2709 inquiries have a nexus to a foreign power,
replacing that prerequisite with a broad standard of relevance to investigations of
165

terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

If the arguments employed in

Marrero’s opinion sound familiar after reading Chapter 3,they most certainly should,
Some of the points made in this ruling are

identical to the ones that were being made in

law journals. However, as will be discussed shortly, the Patriot Act Reauthorization may
well have rendered moot the second of Marrero’s points in his mling. Thejudge also
provides powerful language regarding the debate between civil liberties and national
security, remaking that:
Cases engendering intense passions and urgencies to unencumber the govei^ent,
enabling it to move in secrecy to a given end with the mos expedient dispatch
and versatile means, often poses the greatest threats to civil liberties...Times like
these...demand heightened vigilance, especially by the juiciary to ensure that
as a people and a nation, we steer a principled course faithful and true to our stillhonored founding values.”
Remember here, that this is not information coming from an impassioned civil
libertarian; instead, it comes from an opinion written by a federal magistrate.
164
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Doe /. et al. v. Cj'onzalcs (2006)

This case, w liicli w as heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, is the result of the government's appeal ofthe ruling made in Doe v.
The arguments were heard on November 2, 2005, and a decision was reached on May 23,
2006. The alert reader will no doubt notice that the Patriot Act Reauthorization was
passed during the period between argument and decision. Because ofthis, the Court
issued an order on March 15, 2006 requesting supplemental letter briefs from the parties
167

on the impact of the Reauthorization Act on this case.

As reported by the court,“Doe

I no longer presses Fourth Amendment claims on this appeal...Therefore, we deem them
abandoned.

I (»S

However, the Court reveals that Doe I still believes that the First

Amendment is violated in the fomi of prior restraint, despite the government’s assertions
169

to the contrary.

The Court felt that they would not be “prudent to resolve these novel

First Amendment issues as a part of this appeal, and sent it back to the Southern D’
170

of New York.

While the Court does concede that the Revision Act modified the gag

provision, it stops short of giving it the stamp

of constitutionality.^^^ This move is not

surprising considering the changes that had taken place since

the initial ruling by the

Southern District. In fact, if Doe had still chosen to pursue the Fourth Amen
challenge, it seems very likely that that portion of the case

would have been remanded to

the original court as well.
In the concurring opinion, written by Circuit Judge Cardamone, an interesting
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point is brouglit tor\\ ard. w hich may give some suggestion as to future actions planned
by the government. C'ardamone w rites “The government perseveres, insisting that a
permanent ban on speech is permissible under the First Amendment. This issue warrants
comment, especialK’ because 1 suspect that a perpetual gag...may likely be
-r
unconstitutional. “ According to Cardamone,the government seeks this perpetual
gag because, in essence, they believe that all terrorism investigations are ongoing
173

forever,

The concluding remarks in this concurrence gives a strong hint about which

way this judge would vote if the issue were to come before this court again:
44

Although 1 concur in the per curiam that declines to resolve the novel First Amendment

issue before us...that does not mean 1 think tliat issue unworthy ofcomment. Hence,this
„ 174

concurrence.

J udging by the tone of the commentary that precedes this statement, it

seems to me that it is quite possible Cardamone would have liked to vote against the
government, but decided to wait for the case to be brought again, thus allowing for the
proper judicial channels to be followed.

Hamdan v. Rumsfield(2006)
The Supreme Court provided the decision in this case. According to the facts of
the case, Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was being held at Guantanamo Bay,Cuba, after
being charged with “conspiracy ‘to commit... offenses triable by military
commission.

175

According to the Court,

In habeas and mandamus petitions, Hamdan asserted that the military commission
172
173
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lacks authority to tr> him because(1) neither congressional Act nor the common
law of war supports trial by this commission for conspiracy, an offense that,
Hamdan sa\ s, is not a \ iolation of the law of war; and(2)the procedures adopted
to try him violate basic tenets of military and international law,including the
principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against
him.^
The District Court agreed with Hamdan’s argument, but the Court of Appeals for the
177

District of Columbia reversed this decision.

In their ruling, the Supreme Court issued a

stinging rebuke to the Bush administration. Among other things, the opinion held that the
aforementioned military commission “is not expresslyjustified by any Congressional act
and “lacks the power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the
.178

CMJ and the four Gene\ a conventions signed in 1949.

This opinion is such a big

blow to the Bush administration because it continued the trend the Court is currently
displaying of showing little leniency toward restricting the rights of detainees.

Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department ofTreasury(2006)
This case presented another opportunity for the United States District Court for
the Central District of California to rule on an aspect oftlie waron terrorism. The
in this court in 2004. As
plaintiffs were the same group that had provided a challenge in
identified by Judge Audrey Collins’ opinion, their complaint was

multi-faceted:

Plaintiffs challenge five aspects of tlie EO and its accompanjdng Re^lations^
First, they contend that the EC's ban on "services" is"titutionally
because it fails to adequately notify the public, and Plaintiffs specifica y,
conduct to which the ban applies. Furthermore,they argue that the ^
"services" is overbroad because it encompasses a substantial amoun p
speech. Second, they assert that the EO Regulations are vague because y
contain no definition of the temi "specially designated terronst^ p.
giving the President unfettered discretion to designate wbch indi
176

See page 1.
000 U.S. 05-184. See page 1.
178
See pages 2-3

177

65

L

groups 111 w ithin lhai tcnn. Third. Plaintiffs contends that the Presidents
dcsiu.naiic>n auihorii\. as exercised in the EO itself and as distinct from the
desiiination auihorit\’ delegated to the secretary oftreasury, is unconstitutionally
vague, l ounli, Pl.iin'tilTs contend that the EO’s ban on being "othemse associated
witli" a terronst uroup is vague and overbroad,as it punishes individuals and
groups for exercising tlieir First Amendment right to freedom ofassociation.
Fifth. PhuntilTs niaintain that the RegulaUons'licensing provision violates the
First and Fifth .\mendments because it eontains no substantive or procedural
safeguards for detemiinitig which individuals or groups qualify for a license. As
such, accorditig to Plaintiffs, the licensing provision gives authorities unfettered
discretion to grant or deny a license.
Judge Audrey Collins ruled in favor of the government in regard to the argument that the
order used the temi serv ices too vaguely, concluding that it passes musters both
ISl

facially’

and as applied.

182

Collins also ruled that “services” was not overbroad,

and

that “Plaintiffs’ challenge to the EC’s use ofthe term ‘specially designated terrorist
group’ lacks merit.

Although she did not find the term to be unconstitutional,she did

find the vague nature of the President’s ability to designate groups as such to be
184

unacceptable,
(4C

She also ruled that the language forbidding organizations frombemg

otherwise associated w'ith’ an SDGT

unconstitutional on its face.

Moreover,

Collins found this provision to be overbroad.'“Finally, Collins decUned to rule on the
merits of a challenge to the Office of Foreign Assets Control licensing power,ruling the
plaintiffs’ did not have standing to sue.'*’ The decision was a split victory, as both sides
had some of their arguments upheld. Because this is the second case discussed in the
thesis in which Judge Collins presided, it is worth considenng her personal history. The
179
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judge is “A former
.; ss

President Clinton.'

Angeles prosecutor nominated to the federal bench in 1994 by
Therefore, although she was appointed by a Democrat, it is highly

unlikely that she is merely a liberal jurist seeking to blunt a conservative President

Summary/Conclusion
As can be seen from the preceding discussion,the Supreme Court and the rest of
the federal court system has a varied history in weighing national securities and civil
liberties. The Supreme Court has made explicitly clear that the nghts guaranteed m the
Constitution arc not absolute, especially when the country is at war. Specifically, the
Court has often endorsed the limiting of First Amendment rights. However,the justices
have also been sure to note that the government is not given a blank check. The Fourth
Amendment picture is much less clear, and it is possible that the future battles
over the Patriot Act may provide some clarity in this regard. The lower courts have
already provided several rulings on the Patriot Act, and have identified possible
flaws in the legislation. If these decisions continue on their way throughout the court
system, it will be left to the Supreme Court to ultimately decide whether or not the
perceived intrusions on the rights of citizens are justified. The Court has been largely
unsympathetic to the government’s arguments recently in regard to the war on terror.
It is also worth pointing out what exactly I have meant when I have referred to
the continued challenges which are likely to occur in regard to the USA Patriot Act. It
would be highly unorthodox for a party in a suit to challenge the entirety ofthe Act in
one lawsuit, or even all of the provisions that they contend are indefensible. It will be
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much more likcK tor certain Sections to be challenged individually, and some ofthese
lawsuits have already begun their journey. Judgingby the agitation of many civil
libertarians, it is likely such suits will continue. As promised at the outset, the following
chapter will attempt to predict w hat the courts actually will do,and I will also comment
on what I believe they ought to do.

68

Chapter 5
.Analysis

Introduction
The point of uiulcrtaking any study of this nature is to find answers to the
question posed. At tlic beginning of this study, 1 identified a research question that would
frame the endeavor undertaken: “Docs the USA Patriot Act exceed the need for enhanced
national security by violating the U'and d* Amendments to the United States
Constitution?” I have cone hided that portions of the USA Patriot Act, may,in fact.
violate the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens ofthis fine country,
I will provide my reasoning shortly, but I must

first make a few comments about

is conclusion to be interpreted as an attack
my reasoning. To begin with, I do not mean this
on the Congress or the President. Our governmental leaders have been confronted with an
,the Act which
unusually diffrcult problem, and I certainly do not envy them. Moreover
they worked in concert to produce, and passed very rapidly,included only a ban
questionable provisions. In the following pages, I will lay out my opimons on each ofthe
Sections, and provide predictions about what type ofaction I believe the courts are likely
to take in regard to each. As will be seen, I agree with legal scholars on some provisions,
and disagree on others. Before beginning that analysis, it is important to fi:ame the
composition of the current United States Supreme Court and the ideology ofits members.
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L

The Supreme C'ouri
The Supreme Court is made up of nine justices who serve lifetime appointments.
President George W. Bush has had the opportunity to mold the Court, with two
appointees during his tenn. In addition, as will be discussed momentarily, Bush may well
get the chance for further tinkering. This is an important point to make,because as been
hammered home numerous times in this discussion,the Bush admimstration had a vital
hand in the fonnation ot the USA Patriot Act. The current nine justices, in order of
seniority, staring with the Chief Justice, are: Jolin Roberts, John Paul Stevens, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy. David Souter, Clarence Thomas,Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito. Alito and Roberts were both nominated by President
George W. Bush. In addition, Thomas and Souter were nominated by his father. President
George H. W. Bush. Ginsburg and Breyer are the only two current Justices nominated by
l‘)0

a Democratic President.
The point is that Republican appointed Justices make up a large majority ofthe
current Court. Stevens was bom in 1920,’^' and there is at least some chance that Bush
will have the opportunity to appoint another Justice because ofStevens’ age. I would
certainly suggest that Bush is more conservative than Gerald Ford was. However,Bush
would have to contend with a Democratic Congress,rather than the Republican Congress
he had with the two previous nominations. Whether or not Bush gets that opportunity, it
is readily apparent that this is a conservative court. I draw this conclusion from the wellestablished idea that the Republican Party is largely composed ofindividuals leaning
toward conservative beliefs, while the members of the Democratic Party often slant
190
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toward liberal ideologies, rherefore, it seems likely that Presidents ofeach party would
strive to nominate justices with ideologies similar to that oftheir respective parties. To
many, this may suggest that the Court will pro\dde a rubber stamp to the provisions ofthe
Patriot Act. Howe\ er, the Court may not be as conservative as it would appear to be.
Party affiliation is not always an accurate predictor ofideology. This is a fairly basic
axiom in political discourse: not every member of a party shares the exact same beliefs.
In addition,judging by some of the decisions 1 have discussed, the Court is unlikely to
give the Congress and llic President a blank check in the war on terror. The Court that has
made these rulings was made up of a group ofjustices sharing an ideology sinular to that
of the current one. While it was true that George W.Bush has subsequently replaced two
of these justices, Rehnquist and O’ Connor, these two would hardly be considered hberal.
On the other hand, it is also improbable that the current Court will also wildly liberal
rulings. In the following pages, 1 will predict their reaction to the Sections discussed in
Chapter 3.

Section 203
Section 203, as readers will recall, deals with information sharing among vanous
law enforcement organizations. As mentioned when initially discussing this Section, only
one of the articles 1 referenced in this study took issue with this Section. Many ofthe
more flawed provisions drew numerous critics. While this, by itself, is not enough to
look at it with much
ensure the constitutionality of this provision, it certainly makes me
article, I believe the
greater scrutiny. After studying the provision, and reviewing Evans
requirements contained in this portion of the Act are
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reasonable, and will be upheld if

they arc challenged in court. Even if a lower court rules against this provision, it is highly
unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow such a decision to stand. While it terms of
pure constitutionality this idea may seem suspect, the need for national security in times
of war seems likelv to outweigh the individual liberties that are sacrificed here. It
certainly provides much less of an encumbrance to civil liberties than previous laws
which were upheld by the Supreme Court, incasess\xchzsDenniswAKorematsu.As
long as law cn forcement docs not abuse the power given here, this Section will likely
endure any legal challenge.

Section 206
Section 206 deals with roving surv'eillance authority under FISA. It is much
problematic than Section 203, but.

more

as with Section 203,there are not many voices

clamoring to criticize it. Moreover, it was amended during the revision hearings. The
particularity requirement argument introduced by Jeremy Smith is simply not strong
enough to mark unconstitutionality. In fact, I agree with the government s argument m
this regard, which is that the particularity of person is maintained in regard to the
wiretaps

For this reason, if challenged, the provision is unlikely to be found

problematic by the federal judiciary. However,this status

could be changed ifthe sunset

unset condition is a very essential
provisions are removed without suitable analysis. The s
ofthis law. Through
addition, because it ensures that the Congress will monitor the use
this monitoring, they can ensure that the particularity requirement is not being violated,
The mere presence of oversight is also important,because

through checks and balances.

it helps to ensure that the executive branch does not overreach in carrying out its duties,
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thus fulfilling a \ cilucd C'onsiiiuiional hallmark.

Section 213
Section 213 is likely unconstitutional. As discussed in Chapter 3,the idea of
“sneak and peek" \ iolates the Constitutional right protecting citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is contained in the Fourth Amendment. It
seems only a matter of time before challenge is brought to this law,and judges are
improbable to find a legial rationale for allowing tliis continue. The argument for national
security is simply not strong enouggh here. The ruling in Korematsu comes the closest to
providing a legally defensible

reason for tliis provision. However,even the extreme

limiting of rights that occurred in that case were limited to one

subset ofsociety, rather

than the American people in general. National security is certainly importan,
ovemmental actions such
has been discussed numerous times in this thesis. However,g

as

this one make the United States move in the direction of a socialist typeg
Moreover, in my opinion, taking steps this extreme gives

the terrorists a victory, because

they seek to upset the way of life enjoyed in this country. I find this Sec
disturbing, and, as mentioned in Chapter 3,1 am joined by a large majority ofAmerican ,
in our
and lots of legal scholars. It is difficult to envision it surviving the court system
democratic society, and I predict it will not.

Section 215
Section 215 provides for governmental access to

a wide variety or personal

ertainly violates the First and
records or private American citizens. In so doing, it almost c
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Fourth Anicndmcius, It i;icarlv has the potential to createachilling effect on theright of
citizens to self-expression. Throughout Chapter 4, numerous cases were discussed wUch
involved the limittng ofl-trst Amendment rights. However,abuse this excessive must not
be tolerated. Also galling ts the language xvhich basically lowers the privacy lights of
average Americans to the lower level of privacy resented for foreign nationals. In
researching this Act. 1 was astonished by the folly ofthe Congress in passing such a
provision. Considering the nature

of this study (i.e., continually searching for terms such

as “terror”) I even feared that the gov-●emment might serve the campus library with a
is somewhat tongue-in-cheek, this provision
warrant . While the preceding sentence is
would allow for such an occurrence to take place. Again, I must reiterate the point made
in the previous page National security is important, but helping terrorists attain their
their mission. This provision is unlikely to meet the

goals does not dissuade them from
standard necessary to pass muster

under judicial scrutiny.

Section 216
Section 216 concerns gove

mmental monitoring of electronic communications,

such as websues accessed and e-mail. It

quite conceivably unconstitutional because of

in regarding content. I agree with Robert Ditzion’s
the vague language contained therein
analysis, which argues that people

have higher expectations of privacy with internet

„Ho„.
their e-

'"ail to be mon itored by the go

Section

certainly opens the door

vemment. However, the vague language in this

for overzealous law enforcement authorities to do that
trated that lower courts have already struck down

chapter 4, it was demons

L
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certain provisions of ilic Patriot Act on vagueness grounds. In addition, Jeremy Smith is
correct in asserting that the privacy and Fourth Amendment rights of Americans are
violated. The argument for unconstitutionality is strong here,through the First and Fourth
Amendment arguments presented. The Supreme Court would likely rule against this
provision provided it is challenged.

Section 218
Section 218 allow s for the government to seek court orders fixim FISA which
allow for surveillance, rather than a nomial court. The provision does not appear to
achieve Constitutional merit, because it does not allow a true form ofjudicial review to
take place. By allowing approval to go through the FISA court, the Congress erred
greatly. 1 agree with the scholars’ assertion that the Fourth Amendment is violated in this
process,because there is a lack of true probable cause requirements. However,I do not
believe the federal judiciary will ultimately overturn this Section ifit is challenged. It
may not be upheld at the lower levels, but Uie Supreme Court would likely overturn any
such decision. Although the Court has shown its willingness to rule against certain
fundamental as in cases
aspects of the war on terror, the rights violated here are not as
such as Rasul and Hamdan. The violation of rights is also not as

excessive as some of

the previous Sections which I have predicted will be overturned. In short, this Section
ine exists regarding this
provides a close call. In fact, it seems to me that no firm doctnne
al that it logically follows that
type of surveillance. It is when all are other factors are equ
ideology will be the deciding factor in the decision. Conservatives traditionally pla
large amount of value on public safety and national defense
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Legal rationale could be

provided for either side, and cnliLinccd need for national security certainly qualifies as a
defensible argument. In this instance, a Supreme Court which is composed largely of
conserv'atives will probabK reject any challenges to this provision.

Section 505
Section 505 deals with access to private records, in a fashion similar to Section
215. Along with Section 215. this is the most egregious provision ofthe Patriot Act. In
fact, as suggested by the scholars referenced in Chapters, it presents even more daunting
problems than Section 215. It has a great potential to produce a chilling effect in violation
of the First Amendment, and unreasonably reduces the role ofthe judicial branch s
oversight powers. Instead, by placing great power in the hands ofthe FBI,it severely
upsets the balance of power intended in the Constitution. This power is further driven
home by the practice of the law: as discussed in Chapter 3,the FBI often has not followed
the correet reporting procedures. Given these facts, it is highly improbable that the
Supreme Court would allow the law to stand as currently applied. At the very least, the
Court may enter an order requiring that the oversight requirements be properly followed.
However, it is far more likely that the Court will react against the intrusions ofthe
judicial branch’s power. In so doing, they would be following their own precedent tom
Ived in decisions regarding
Rasul, which asserted the Judiciary branch’s right to be invo
the war on terror, over the executive branch’s objections. This would not be a surpn g
are aware that the
decision, because, regardless of ideology, the justices ofthe Court
illingly cede the third
Supreme Court is the head of the judiciary branch. Ifthey wi _
branch’s power, they are also giving up their own power.
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Summar\ C'onclusions
Sections 203 and 2tU\ though far from perfect, are allowable under the current
conditions this nation faces. This would likely not be the case ifthe country was not m a
worldwide war, but that is beside the point. Sections 213,215,216,218,and 505 cannot
be wholeheartedly defended with knowledge of the various mandates provided in the
Constitution, and with the legal decisions reached in previous cases. The arguments
against some, especially 213,215, and 505, are stronger than others. Unfortunately,some
of the others provide a less clear picture, which allows for some judicial discretion. It is
imperative that the third branch embrace its role, and ensure that this law is not allowed
to continue in its current fomi. 1 emphasize tlie importance ofrole, because sometimes
in partisan politics, which greatly threatens our system of
the justices get too caught up in
government. As previously

discussed, the Justices ofthe Supreme Court are supposed to

be immune from political pressures and affiliations. In this instance,they must be.
must be taken, on
Advocates of national security may try to argue that extreme measures
the rationale that even one terrorist attack can cause widespread damage.I would concur
wholeheartedly on the second point. However,it is imperative to remember what this
nation stands for, and what the soldiers who fight everyday are

indeed protecting. It is

ise the troops for lighting to
very commonplace to hear speeches in which politicians praise
,so
defend our freedom,” The point is this: They are fighting hard to defend freedoms
why would we want our own government to

undercut them with foolish and unneeessary

measures?
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